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Abstract Proponents of physical intentionality argue that the classic hallmarks of
intentionality highlighted byBrentano are also found in purely physical powers. Critics
worry that this idea ismetaphysically obscure at best, and atworst leads to panpsychism
or animism. I examine the debate in detail, finding both confusion and illumination
in the physical intentionalist thesis. Analysing a number of the canonical features of
intentionality, I show that they all point to one overarching phenomenon of which
both the mental and the physical are kinds, namely finality. This is the finality of
‘final causes’, the long-discarded idea of universal action for an end to which recent
proponents of physical intentionality are in fact pointing whether or not they realise
it. I explain finality in terms of the concept of specific indifference, arguing that in the
case of themental, specific indifference is realised by the process of abstraction, which
has no correlate in the case of physical powers. This analysis, I conclude, reveals both
the strength and weakness of rational creatures such as us, as well as demystifying
(albeit only partly) the way in which powers work.
Keywords Metaphysics · Powers · Intentionality · Final causes
1 Introduction
There is something mysterious about powers, and philosophers generally do not like
mystery. The aversion is even greater when attempts at partial demystification—with
the emphasis on partial—involve the revival of ideas long thought buried by a more
enlightened, scientifically-informed view of the world. When we look at the cur-
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rent debate over powers and intentionality, however, we see certain concepts of a
‘pre-enlightened’ age stubbornly poking through the undergrowth, albeit clothed in a
different nomenclature. That some metaphysicians find themselves reaching back to
supposedly ‘outdated’ ideas and ways of thinking in order to clear some of the fog
surrounding powers is hardly proof of their veracity. Still, the durability of these ideas
among philosophers at the centre of debate about powers surely makes themworthy of
serious consideration both within and outside the confines in which they are currently
employed.
That non-mental powers1 are thought to share at least some, it not all, of the fea-
tures of intentionality—what Franz Brentano took to be the ‘mark of the mental’2—is
the striking view of a number of power theorists.3 They differ among themselves as
to what conclusion is to be drawn from their observations. For Martin and Pfeifer,
a distinction is still to be made between intentionality and powers, but it cannot be
found in any one or combination of the classic features of intentionality champi-
oned since Brentano—by, for example, Searle and Chisholm.4 They suggest instead
that the source of intentionality be located in perceptual experience—albeit they do
not seem to consider the intentionality of experience itself as requiring explanation.
According to Place, some of the classic features of intentionality are reducible to oth-
ers and do carry over to powers, but intensionality with an ‘s’—referential opacity
(Quine), indirect reference (Frege)—does not. This does not mean, he adds, that we
have found the ‘long searched for essence’ distinguishing either mental from physi-
cal language or mental states from physical states, since intensionality is a feature of
quotational contexts—‘what someone has said or might be expected to say’.5 Again,
though, Place ignores the evident connection between quotation and mentality: only
of a certain kind of creature, capable of thinking about objects in a certain way,
can it be affirmed that they said or might be expected to say something. Molnar is
forthright that there is such a thing as ‘physical intentionality’ sharing all the classic
features of (mental) intentionality identified by Brentano, so he refines the picture
by grounding the intentionality characteristic of rational minds in both conscious-
ness and representation, whereas the intentionality of powers is non-conscious and
non-representational.6
Needless to say, other writers are convinced that talk of ‘physical intentionality’,
intentionality as the ‘mark of the dispositional’, and the like, is itself responsible for
confusion bordering on incoherence. For Barker, physical intentionality is ‘deeply
obscure’.7 Mumford asserts what most philosophers would claim, namely that ‘an
understanding of certain physical properties as intentional or directed is altogether the
1 I will often speak of ‘powers’ without qualification, but unless context suggests otherwise I will mean any
power that is not itself either mental in general or a specific mental power characterised by intentionality.
2 Brentano (1995/1874, pp. 68–69).
3 Molnar (2003); Place (1996); Martin and Pfeifer (1986).
4 Searle (1983); Chisholm (1967).
5 Place (1996, pp. 112–113).
6 Molnar (2003, Chap. 3); see p. 81 for the refined picture and a summary of his position.
7 Barker (2013, p. 649).
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wrong sort of image that we need for the physical world.’8 Armstrong, considering that
the introduction of intentionality into the physical fabric of the universe would endow
it with some ‘strange, and, it may be thought, objectionable, features’,9 proposes a
wholly categorical, i.e. non-dispositional or potency-free, account of the world.
This paper is a contribution to the task of partial demystification. I will examine
a number of the canonical features of mental intentionality10—the ones that have
generally attracted the most attention in the debate over supposed analogies with
physical powers11—with the aim of showing that they all point to one overarching
phenomenon of which both the mental and the physical are kinds, namely finality.
This is the finality of ‘final causes’, the long-discarded idea of universal action for an
end to which recent proponents of physical intentionality are in fact pointing whether
or not they realise it. A proper understanding of the classic hallmarks of intentionality
reveals them as being features of finality, which I will explain in terms of the concept of
specific indifference. In the course of the argument, I aim to show in particular that one
of the canonical features—intensionality (with an ‘s’)—is no more than a feature of
abstraction, which is itself the fundamental characteristic of rational mentality. There
is no such parallel in the world of physical powers. I will end by examining finality
in more detail, arguing that the power of abstraction distinguishing rational mentality
from physical powers reveals both the strength and the weakness of rational creatures.
Yet although this way of resolving the debate about physical intentionality demystifies
much, there is a mystery about finality itself that demands further exploration.
2 Directedness
When one considers intentionality, or seeks to list its hallmarks, the term ‘directedness’
(like ‘aboutness’) is usually the first that comes to mind. Brentano himself spoke of
‘direction [Richtung] toward an object’.12 The very term ‘intentionality’ derives from
the ‘esse intentionale’ of scholastic philosophy,13 with ‘intentionale’ itself arguably
finding its roots in ‘intendo’, as in ‘to aim at, reach towards’, which term itself is
8 Mumford (1999, p. 217).
9 Armstrong et al. (1996, p. 16).
10 By using the term ‘mental intentionality’ I do not wish to presuppose, in advance of analysing the issues,
that there is any other kind of intentionality. I am merely contrasting the intentionality of the mental with
alleged physical intentionality. Needless to say, those who deny the latter think mental intentionality is the
only kind of intentionality there is.
11 Throughout the paper I do not intend anything by the term ‘physical’ other than ‘non-mental’. In this
wholly general sense chemical and biological powers, for instance, are physical powers—the powers of
bodily entities qua bodily (of a certain kind, such as mammal or molecule), even if the powers in question
are those of a creature with rational mentality. By ‘mental’ I mean something narrower: mental powers are,
for my purposes, those of rational creatures, whether human or otherwise. Needless to say, not any power
of a rational creature (say, Fred’s ability to lift heavy weights) counts as mental; rather, mental powers are
powers of rational creatures qua rational, or insofar as they are rational.
12 Brentano (1995/1874, p. 68).
13 See, for example, Aquinas’s Summa Theologica I q.56 a.2 ad 3, Aquinas (1920, p. 63) and several other
places. The term ‘esse intentionale’ was also used by St Albert the Great in his De Anima. For a detailed
survey of the term’s usage in Aquinas, see Murray (1993).
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found in Aquinas and other scholastic thinkers. Needless to say, ‘directedness’, like
‘intentionality’ itself, is a term of art whose application is easier to recognise than to
define. Even if we do not know what it ultimately involves, we know what it means to
say that Albert is thinking about Napoleon, that Belinda wants a drink, and that Charlie
hopes forworld peace.Their thoughts, desires, andhopes are directed at certain entities,
events, states of affairs, and so on. Less obscurely, but without presuming to remove
themystery of what directedness involves, we can speak of directedness to some object
of thought as being the very content of the thought itself, as Brentano himself seems
to suggest by speaking in the same place of ‘reference to a content’ [Beziehung auf
einen Inhalt].
Since the alleged analogy between intentionality and how things are with powers
is our main concern, it is easy to see why sceptics about physical intentionality would
balk at the very idea. The directedness of thoughts must be at least partially constituted
by such interconnected activities and abilities as representation, concept possession,
and consciousness. Short of panpsychism, none of these is present in purely physical
entities. Salt’s power to dissolve in water, however we explain it, cannot involve the
representation of water or possession of the concept of water, let alone consciousness.
The same goes for the power of water to dissolve salt, the power of material bodies to
reflect light, of particles to attract or repel each other, or of the sun to heat the earth.
Hence Bird, who regards directedness as ‘ill-defined’ when applied to the physical,
claims: ‘Agency clearly shows directedness: one acts or strives to bring something
about, but one wouldn’t want to ascribe agency or striving to dispositions’.14 This
sort of agential directedness requires ‘a concept of what is being striven for, with
a plan for attaining the object striven for’.15 Here he follows Mumford, who asks
rhetorically whether a soluble substance ‘strives’ to be dissolved, or a fragile object
‘aims’ to be broken. To accept such descriptions is to take the high road to ‘animism’
or panpsychism.16
U.T. Place is right to insist that directedness ‘in some sense’ is a feature of powers
and that any theory must account for it.17 Molnar too is correct that panpsychism only
threatens if the sceptic begs the question against the physical intentionality thesis by
assuming Brentano to be right in holding both that intentionality entails directedness
and that directedness entails mentality. It is the second conjunct that the physical
intentionalist denies. Still, this leaves the physical intentionalist with the undischarged
obligation of saying something non-metaphorical about directedness. For if striving,
aiming, planning, and so forth are not essential to directedness, and nothing else can
replace them, surely the physical intentionalist is saddling power theory with a term
that is pregnant with suggestiveness but devoid of content?
Let us be clear first that there is some phenomenon here that needs accounting for,
and let us call it directedness for present purposes and for want of anything better. It
does not apply to what are now called ‘categorical’ qualities, and which I will call
14 Bird (2007, p. 120).
15 Ibid, p. 121.
16 Mumford (1999, p. 221).
17 Place (1999, p. 227).
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‘actualities’ (in contrast with ‘potencies’ or ‘potentialities’). Neither the shape nor size
of an object is directed at any other event, state, or process. The same goes for arrange-
ment of parts, symmetry, and temporal or spatial distance. Again, the directedness of
a power is not like a relation, such as being to the left of or having the same colour as.
(I will say more about this later.) Needless to say, the real distinction between potency
and actuality that I advocate is hardly a given in contemporary metaphysics: contrast,
for example, the pan-dispositionalism of Bird, at least for fundamental properties,18
with the pan-categoricalism of Armstrong.19 And there is a ‘mixed’ view, usually seen
as an identity theory, according to which every property has the nature of both actuality
and potentiality: every actuality is a potentiality and vice versa. To argue directly for
a real dualism of potentiality and actuality is beyond the scope of this paper: I note,
for dialectical purposes, that my positive account of directedness is consistent with
pan-dispositionalism,20 though my diagnosis of the mistakes in the physical inten-
tionalist view assumes the real distinction of act and potency. None of my account,
however, is compatible with pan-categoricalism or a mixed view. Pan-categoricalism,
of course, denies the very reality of powers, so explaining their directedness is not in
question. The mixed view also, in my view, although officially committed to the real-
ity of powers, is at its heart more sceptical than the power realist can countenance.21
While the pan-dispositionalist, then, should find much that is congenial in my account
of directedness, I would hope also that pan-categoricalists and other sceptics about
the reality of powers might see that the view they oppose is not as mystifying as they
think.
That said, we need to enter significant qualifications of the thesis that actualities
and potencies are really distinct kinds of property. Actualities and potencies are not
metaphysically independent features of things: there is no sense in which, either syn-
chronically or diachronically, a material substance is composed of some group of
actualities and another group of potentialities. This is so even if you could list them
all. Actualities entail powers and powers entail actualities: nothing material can fall
without having a size; nothing material can have a shape without the power to resist
certain kinds of force.No actuality fails to entail at least one power on the part of its pos-
sessor, and vice versa. This is so whether or not all powers are in some way ‘grounded’
in actualities. But this claim of metaphysical interdependence no more implies that
actualities are powers or powers are actualities than necessarily concurrent effects
of a common cause are the same effect. There is more than analogy here, since the
18 Bird (2007).
19 Armstrong et al. (1996).
20 I leave aside power monism’s serious problems; see, for instance, Oderberg (2012).
21 Heil (2003) advocates a mixed view. Although he denies it, the mixed view seems to be a dual aspect
theory, whereby there is only a conceptual or aspectual difference between act and potency. His worries (p.
119) derive from thinking of the aspects as themselves just further properties, albeit higher-order. But one
should not think this way. Denying the real distinction between act and potency means regarding both act
and potency not as properties of objects but rather as ways in which we as subjects can regard properties
of objects—as having a dispositional or categorical character, depending perhaps on circumstance and
conditions of observation. To be sure, Heil does not advocate this position, as his view is that every property
strictly possesses both a categorical and a dispositional nature. Since, however, this ascribes to properties
strictly incompatible natures, it seems Heil must end up with something like a dual aspect view.
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mutual dependence of act and potency is itself a necessary consequence of being a
material substance.22 More precisely, that a material substance has both actualities
and potentialities derives from its generic nature as material; what those actualities
and potentialities are in a particular case will depend on the complete essence of the
substance concerned.23
Why, however, suppose there to be an entailment between act and potency? They
might both have a common cause in the essence of the substance yet remain merely
regularly connected in virtue of that cause, rather than mutually entailing. In reply,
the brief general argument for the stronger thesis of mutual entailment depends only
on the assumption that material substances undergo genuine change—the venerable
Aristotelian point. If substances have actualities and undergo change, they must be
capable—i.e., have the potential—to undergo change. Conversely, if they have the
potential to undergo change, there must be actualities they change from and to. Hence,
without even needing to think of specific examples (not a difficult task), we have a
relatively24 a priori argument for the strong thesis that every actuality entails some
potentiality and vice versa. Note that I have not established the strong thesis that
every particular actuality entails a particular potency (or vice versa). If the argument
from change is sound, then every actuality the having of which an object can change
from or into will entail the potentiality to undergo that change. And since all concrete
objects are changeable, that they have actualities entails that they have potentialities
as well (and vice versa). I would go further and assert that every actuality of a concrete
material substance is changeable, though it may require that the substance cease to
exist.25 There are a number of theses in the neighbourhood which may or may not be
true concerning the entailments between potentialities and actualities. My own view
is that every single actuality of a concrete object entails some potentiality or other,
and that there are tight connections between kinds of actuality and kinds of correlative
potency. To explore this would go well beyond the present discussion; moreover, I
take it largely to be an a posteriori matter what those connections are.
Unfortunately, it is this tight dependence between the actual and the potential that
gives rise to systematic ambiguity in the way we speak of the qualities of things.
22 If, as hylemorphism holds, material substances are themselves resolvable into the actuality of form and
potentiality of matter, there will be a fundamental act/potency distinction underlying all the others, but
whether this is the effect of a further underlying (or overlying) cause is another question.
23 As I discuss later, although essentialism is congenial to the account of powers I will be giving, it is not
as far as I can tell entailed by it, leaving the anti-essentialist free to construe my account in terms of mere
kinds.
24 Relatively, because we have to assume both that there are material substances and that they undergo
change. Although the argument from change is decisive in showing that every (changeable) actuality entails
some potency and vice versa, it does not of course show which actualities entail which potencies (and vice
versa). Nor could any wholly general argument demonstrate this, since it is largely an a posteriori matter,
uncovered both by common observation and careful attention to empirical detail.
25 One might object: if Bessie the cow can lose her tail, then the actuality of her having a tail entails the
potentiality to lose it. But she cannot change from being a cow, so the actuality of being a cow (or at least
those actualities that are part of the essence of a cow) does not obviously entail any potentiality. Reply: the
argument from change applies both to accidental and to substantial change. Bessie can change from being
a cow, but she cannot survive such a change. Still, that she is a cow entails the potentiality to cease to fall
under that substantial kind (and hence cease to exist).
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We can describe an object’s shape without reference to any potency whatsoever, but
when we say ‘this piece of wood is square’ we might be referring to its power to
fit into some other shape (suppose we are putting down a floor) or to be worked
into something else (‘this will make a nice panel for a toy box’). The same goes for
relations, where for example the only reason for asserting that A is to the left of B
might be that A is more easily seen. Most of our usual interest in the actual qualities
of things is conditioned by what powers those actualities confer, but that an actuality
confers a power on its possessor, or that having a power entails having a certain
actual quality, should not lead us to confound these fundamentally distinct kinds of
characteristic.
In no way do actualities have any directedness: if possessed, an actuality needs
no stimulus, and has no manifestation distinct from its possession: it is manifested
by its very possession, even if it is not manifest in the sense of being easy or even
possible to observe, and even if the object possessing it needs some kind of stimulus
for the actuality to be observable.26 So far, so little progress, for all I have done is
describe what distinguishes a power from an actuality. Yet we can go further, giving
some flesh to the floating metaphors of ‘directedness’, ‘pointing’, ‘aboutness’ and
‘what-forness’27 beloved of physical intentionalists. Directedness is just a way of
characterising part of the very essence of any object possessing a power, whether or
not the power itself is essential or merely contingent to its possessor and whether or
not this characterisation is explicit or implicit in a given statement of the essence.
The characterisation in question is one way of understanding what the scholastic
philosophers called finality—action for an end. If all objects have powers—where,
both for simplicity’s sake and for that of focusing on the primary case, by ‘object’
I mean ‘material substance’—then if all powers display finality, so do all objects.
Directedness itself is necessary for that finality to be the wholly general feature of
objects that it is.
3 Specific indifference
Needless to say, talk of finality is just another way of talking about ‘final causes’, and
we all know that these were banished from both philosophy and natural science many
centuries ago.28 This is not the place to enter into general debate about whether the
abolition of finality frommodern science and philosophy resulted from the triumph of
26 Note that Molnar (2003, pp. 170–172), among others, regards what I consider a paradigmatic actuality
such as shape to be in fact dispositional or potential in nature. It is true, as he points out, that there are
some specious arguments for the idea that shape is categorical (actual) rather than dispositional, but he is
far from making the case that it is dispositional. After all, if shape is dispositional, then why—like virtually
every other power—is it not capable of being possessed yet unmanifested? What is the stimulus by which
a square object ‘manifests’ its squareness? What does manifestation even mean in such a context? This is
not the place to explore these questions; suffice it to say that the pan-dispositionalist case is by no means
evident.
27 ‘What-forness’ comes from Martin (2008, p. 59).
28 For a useful overviewof the transition from ‘ancient’ to ‘modern’ conceptions of causality in the universe,
see Osler (1996), and for more detail Burtt (1925).
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argument or of ideology, but as far as powers go I submit that the concept of finality
both replaces metaphor with philosophical content and explains most of what needs
explaining, to the extent it can be explained at all. To show this, I intend to explain
finality in terms of the concept of specific indifference. Finality as specific indifference
involves two components: (i) a specific range of possible manifestations of a power,
and hence a specific range of possible kinds of behaviour by the object having that
power; (ii) indifference with respect to the circumstances of manifestation within that
range.
Specific indifference can easily be illustrated by several simple and unavoidably
jejune examples, parts of which are so obvious as to seem absurd to mention—yet
the obviousness pales beside the depth of the truth involved. (i) Sodium chloride
has the power of dissolution in certain liquids, but in no liquid does it grow leaves
or change into gold. It is specifically limited in what it can do or does in certain
liquids; yet it is indifferent to the circumstances of dissolution, since this will depend
on the circumstances of its introduction into the liquid. By circumstances I mean
whatever is inessential, i.e. accidental, to the manifestation for which the power is
specifically limited. Salt is indifferent to when and where it dissolves, whether the
liquid is in a glass or a bucket, naturally occurring or artificially produced, and so on.
The details, of course, depend on the kinds of entity involved and will be an empirical
matter. Importantly, the difference between what is merely circumstantial and what
is not can seem very fine indeed, even though the metaphysical distinction is wide.
The temperature of a liquid L may be circumstantial to a substance S’s dissolution
in L whereas the amount of L’s viscosity may be essential. Further, temperature
may be essential for one substance as far as its solubility is concerned but merely
circumstantial for another. Again, it is an a posteriori matter as to what counts as
circumstantial. Note that specific indifference applies whether or not the power we are
considering is relatively generic or specific; in other words, the specificity in specific
indifference does not require a highly specific power. The solubility of salt is relatively
generic compared to the more specific power of dissolving in water. That it dissolves
in water rather than remains in its crystal state is a matter of specificity—the limited
behaviour to which the power is directed. But the circumstances of its dissolution in
water are a matter of indifference—when, where, how much water, how much salt,
and so on.
(ii) Female mammals have the power of feeding their young, but in no such young
does the feeding endow them with the power of defying gravity. Mammals are specif-
ically limited in what they can do in nurturing their young; yet the power of nurturing
is itself indifferent to when, where, and other circumstances in which mammalian
young are nurtured. Again, this is a highly generic degree of specific indifference. A
more specific degree is that healthy mammals, when they feed healthy young, cause
the bodily development of the latter, not their degradation. But when, where, and how
a given mammalian offspring develops depends on the kind of mammal and when,
where, and how it is fed.
(iii) Human beings can shape their future but they cannot change their past. They
are specifically limited in how they can act with respect to time but indifferent as to
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how they shape their future; this depends on where they are, what point of their future
they envisage, and how they choose to act.29
The examples may be trite but the metaphysical point is not: all powers, by their
very nature, are governed by specific indifference: there is a range of manifestations to
which the power is restricted, but indifference within the range as to the circumstances
ofmanifestation.30 Using slightly different terminology—towhich Iwill return later—
we can say that powers have a certain indeterminacy in the sense of being determinable
with respect to determinate modes of manifestation. The determinate manifestations
of a single, determinable power demonstrate the indifference of the power to the
circumstantial aspects of its manifestation, and the restriction of the manifestations to
a range show the specificity of the power, in virtue of which the power’s very identity
is a matter of the specific range of its manifestations.
If we accept that even an omnipotent being cannot do the logically impossible, its
omnipotence will also be specifically indifferent—restricted to the logically possible,
but indifferent to what it actually does, where this will be dependent on free choice
if the being is a free agent. To put it another way, a power to do anything whatsoever
is not a power at all. All powers are circumscribed but at the same time carry a range
of freedom that makes them, to a certain degree, indeterminate (a term that must be
handled with care, as later discussion will show). At the risk of some distortion, it is
the circumscription that is the mark of directedness; it is the indeterminacy that is the
mark of potentiality.31
The concept of specific indifference focuses on a ubiquitous phenomenon found
in both physical and mental powers, but as we shall see there are vital differences
between these kinds of power thatmake it highlymisleading to use specific indifference
simpliciter as a foundation for the intentionality that physical intentionalists allege to
be common to both the mental and the physical. First, however, we need to give some
deeper metaphysical content to specific indifference: how, in concreto, is it realised
in bearers of powers? Can we avoid lapsing into the sort of obscure metaphysical talk
that—howevermuch of it theremay ormay not really have been in late scholasticism—
led to the discrediting of final causality?
The scholastic philosophers took the ‘principle of finality’ to be central to the
Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysical edifice. The most common formulation is that
every agent, insofar as it acts, acts for an end. Variations include the proposition that
29 Note: they are not necessarily indifferent to their future in the sense of not caring about it; the indifference
to which I am referring is metaphysical, not psychological: there is no particular future, and no particular
shaping of it, to which their power is limited (all of which has nothing to do with determinism or fatalism).
30 Note that this is not the thesis that there are so-called ‘multi-track’ dispositions, at least where this means
dispositions with different kinds of manifestation. There is a lot of unclarity in the literature about just what
it is to be ‘multi-track’ (Vetter 2013; Bird 2007, pp. 21–24; Molnar 2003, pp. 198–199), but having different
kinds of manifestation is the most plausible meaning. Needless to say, getting a grasp on what distinguishes
kinds of manifestation is crucial, but assuming a principled distinction can be made it will still be the case
that single-track dispositions also display specific indifference. I will return to multi-track dispositions later.
31 The closest I have come to finding the idea of specific indifference in the literature, albeit not expressed in
quite the same terms, isMumford andAnjum’s notion of a ‘selection function’:Mumford andAnjum (2011,
pp. 185, 189–190). Mumford and Anjum’s account of ‘selection’ and their approbatory use of ‘directed’
does seem to be a retreat—better, a move forward—from the view advanced in Mumford (1999), where
‘directedness’ is seen as halfway to animism.
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every nature is ordered to an end; that nature does not act in vain; that the end is
the first principle of activity; and that the end is the reason for all movement.32 The
idea these formulations seek to capture is that final causes—ends of action—are built
into all agents, whether the agents be conscious or not. Centuries-old yet still-recycled
canards about scholastics’ holding that everything ‘tries’ to achieve some end, ‘strives’
for it or ‘seeks’ it (cf. thewilful distortion ofAristotle on objects’ falling to the centre of
the earth) have achieved nothing beyond the misrepresentation of intellectual history
and the retardation of philosophical progress. Key for the scholastics is the idea that
all activity is ordered toward ends, whether the ends be freely chosen or else built into
agents in virtue of their essential constitutions. In the case of mental powers belonging
to rational beings such as ourselves, this fundamental finality ismediated by the process
of abstraction, as I will later explain. We will see that this fact about rational thinkers
does not entail that the same, or even a similar, notion can in any way be applicable
to bearers of mere physical powers. Even if we frame the distinction in terms of the
much-abused word ‘representation’, we are hard pressed to see why intentionality as
a representational notion implies anything representational in physical powers.33 We
can, if we like, speak of powers as having ‘representations’ of their manifestations,
but nothing is to be gained by this Procrustean use of already-fuzzy terminology. Let
us then define what a power represents as precisely the end built into it in virtue of its
essence—Martin’s ‘what-forness’. This is the final cause of the power; better, a final
cause of the power bearer.
Yet what is this final cause? In what sense is it a cause at all? Is it something that
exists? It is enough for present purposes to clarify some misconceptions in order to
bring final causes into focus. First, a final cause most certainly is a cause—only not
an efficient cause. There is no ‘fininculus’34 residing within a power bearer, somehow
activated by a stimulus and thereby making the power bearer manifest its power.
The idea is not only absurd, but on the theory of final causes it would generate a
vicious regress. Final causes are the precondition of the very possibility of any efficient
causality. If fire burns wood but not pure water, if beta particles can penetrate a sheet
32 Wuellner (1956, p. 38) and the references on p. 41 to original sources in Aristotle and Aquinas as well
as to a number of scholastic writers.
33 There is no space to discuss at length the question of whether all mental intentionality involves represen-
tation. It might be thought that sensation is intentional but in no way representational. Molnar thinks that
bodily sensation is a kind of non-representational intentionality (2003, pp. 74–81), thus lending support in
his view to the idea of physical intentionality. It is hard to see what Molnar’s argument establishes. Bod-
ily sensation shows none of the classic Brentanian marks of mental intentionality apart from directedness
which is, as I argue, no more than an aspect of finality as specific indifference. The sensation of cold,
for example, is restricted to a specific range of objects (where the object is just whatever is sensed), and
there is indifference within the range as to the circumstances in which that kind of sensation occurs. But
that is about it, meaning that bodily sensation looks just to be a kind of physical finality (the finality of a
conscious, embodied creature) rather than a phenomenon ‘supporting’ (Molnar 2003, p. 74) the possibility
of physical intentionality. If there is any genuine mental intentionality in bodily sensation, it is exemplified
by the way that a rational thinker conceptualises or represents what she feels, which thoughts are different
from the sensations themselves. The sensations themselves are had by non-rational animals, and they cannot
conceptualise or represent their sensations, let alone perform any abstraction on them.When animals sense,
it is more like what Place calls ‘inspection’ (1996, p. 107): for an animal, feeling pain is like watching prey.
The pure sensation, whether in the human or the animal, is merely an instance of generic finality.
34 ‘Finis’ = ‘end’, ‘purpose’, by analogy with ‘homunculus’.
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of paper but not a sheet of lead, this can only be because the agents are ordered to some
effects rather than others: they each have their own finality, which restricts the range
of their effects (while still having various kinds and degrees of indifference within the
range). Remove the finality and you remove efficient causation altogether. But if this
is the case, there could be no fininculi acting as efficient causes of power manifestation
since they too would require a higher-order finality ordering their own efficient causal
behaviour. We would then have to postulate further, higher-order fininculi, themselves
explained in terms of yet more efficient causation, and so on ad infinitum. We would
never arrive at an explanation of all efficient causality in terms of final causality, contra
the scholastic theory. In any case, that the idea of fininculi is as unscientific as that of
homunculi should be sufficient to dispel it as no more than a pejorative irrelevance.
Secondly, puzzlement over whether final causes ‘exist’ is generated by the very
woolliness of the question. Final causes are real causes, only not efficient. So we
should not expect them to be events, states, processes, or substances of any kind. If
that’s what existence requires, then they do not exist. But why should existence require
this? Plenty of things exist that are neither events, states, processes, or substances.
What about properties, or maybe property instances, which the scholastics usually
called modes?35 Final causes cannot be first-order properties, since these are the ones
whose very finality scholastics take final causes to explain. Although an exploration
of all the options is beyond the space available here, one plausible line of speculation
is that final causes are higher-order properties of agents; we might say, for instance,
that the finality of salt with respect to solubility in water is explained by a higher-order
property governing salt’s first-order structural and compositional properties such that
salt interacts with water in a certain way. If we think of final causes in this fashion
then we must not conceive of them as in any way producing the first-order properties
or doing anything to salt to make it behave in the relevant way. We thus avoid the sort
of regress problem generated by a finincular view of finality.
Still, we need also to think of the final cause as something like a scholastic causal
principle, ametaphysical ‘spring of action’ fromwhich an agent’s first-order behaviour
derives. The final cause governs the way the first-order properties of agents interact,
whetherwithin an agent or between agents. Thefirst-order structural and compositional
properties of salt are governed—as we are speculating—by the higher-order property
of salt’s being directed to dissolution in water. If we decide to step on eggshells by
saying that a final cause is a reason for action, then the final cause governing salt’s
behaviour in water is the reason for its dissolving. This does not imply that salt has a
reason for dissolving in the way that Fred has a reason for putting salt on his salad.
In rational agents, reasons for action are mediated by concepts—better, by abstraction
(worse, by ‘representations’). The reason for salt’s dissolution in water is the final
cause of its behaviour: salt is governed by a higher-order property in virtue of which
it behaves in water in a certain way. That higher-order property is part of the essence
of salt, what scholastics—following Aristotle’s fourfold theory of causation—called
the ‘formal cause’ of salt. In other words, it just is part of the essence of salt to be
35 I use ‘property’ in the contemporary generic sense, whereas the scholastics distinguished between
accidents in general and the more specific kind of accidents known as ‘propria’ or properties strictly
speaking. See further Oderberg (2011).
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soluble in water: when we isolate any power or cluster of powers in virtue of which a
substance behaves in a certain way, we are thereby isolating one or more final causes
of the substance’s behaviour.
Before considering the higher-order account further, I should allay the concern that
the theory I am developing here requires natural kind essentialism, a position toward
which even the most robust defenders of powers are sometimes diffident.36 On the
face of it, although natural kind essentialism is not entailed by the phenomenon of
specific indifference (whether understood as a higher-order property or not), it would
be strange to try to combine specific indifference with an anti-essentialist position on
natural kinds (or species, to use the more traditional scholastic term). For a start, if
all material objects must have some power or other (which is highly plausible), then
specific indifference would appear reasonably to be what we can call a generically
essential feature of all material objects, given that they belong to the genus material
object. Even on the higher-order view, if specific indifference is partly constitutive
of certain first-order structural and compositional properties (part of their essence as
the first-order properties they are), then if all material objects must have some power
or other, they must have some or other of the structural and compositional properties
in virtue of which the higher-order property of specific indifference is true of those
objects. And we might argue by transitivity—albeit put rather loosely—that if specific
indifference is of the essence (since partly constitutive) of these generic first-order
properties, and if they are of the essence of material objects, then specific indifference
is of the essence of the kind material object.
Mightn’t one, however, still be sceptical about whether any more specific kind
of directedness was essential to any more specific kind of material object? Even if
one thought that salt, qua material object, had to have some powers, one might still
deny that solubility in water was essential to it; and this is a well-known matter of
continued debate between dispositional essentialists and their opponents.37 I accept
that my account of directedness does not conclusively settle this question: one might
hold both that particular kinds of directedness were real phenomena of particular kinds
of object and that they were merely accidental to those kinds. We know this to be the
case for the accidental powers that even an essentialist must acknowledge (unless they
espouse hyperessentialism), such as the power of sight or to lift a certain weight. Why
might it not be the case for all powers? Of course, this takes us into a whole new area of
analysis that goes well beyond the position I am defending here; I do not pretend that
my position advances that debate significantly, a debate that is a concern for all power
theorists who are natural kind essentialists. But my position at the very least lends
itself to natural kind essentialism, since specific indifference, whether a higher-level
property or not, looks like a feature of kinds of object that runs about as deep as any
feature can, entering into the very identity of the kind—how it behaves, not merely
how it is structured or composed, in other words the very kind of causal contribution
36 For instance Bird (2007, pp. 208–212) andMumford (2004), the latter beingmuch clearer in his rejection
of natural kind essentialism. By contrast, Molnar (2003, pp. 181–184), Bird (2010), and Hawley and Bird
(2011) show clear commitment to natural kind essentialism. Bird’s thinking has evidently moved more
explicitly in the essentialist direction.
37 See, for instance, the debate between Bird (2001) and Psillos (2002).
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its members make to the natural order. Indeed, if the real directedness of objects with
powers does not go to the very identity of the kinds to which they belong, one begins to
wonder what interest the structural and compositional properties even have, whether in
terms of theory or of scientific and everyday practice. In short, a robustly realist account
of directedness in terms of specific indifference cannot refute the anti-essentialists, but
then it is not supposed to. If, on the other hand, one wishes selectively to maintain
some form of natural kind essentialism without admitting directedness, then one must
show why properties with directedness do not play the sort of role in constituting the
identity of a given kind that other, principally structural and compositional, properties
do. That seems to me a tall order.
In a recent discussion of some of the ways a dispositionalist/power theorist might
explain directedness, Matthew Tugby considers the higher-order property view but is
rather dismissive.38 He accepts one of its advantages, however: like the Platonism he
espouses, butwith lessmetaphysical extravagance, the viewunderwrites the possibility
of unmanifested powers, something all power theorists accept. On Tugby’s Platonism,
the unmanifested fragility of a glass—tomake the point clearer, the only piece of glass
that ever has been or will be—is a reality underwritten by the second-order, internal
manifestation relation between the transcendent universals of (to put it very loosely)
fragility and breaking.39 Iwill examineTugby’s Platonist theory shortly.On the higher-
order view I am tentatively suggesting, by contrast, no such transcendent relation
is necessary: every agent has dispositional properties that are themselves governed
by a higher-order property securing the invariable, essential behaviour of the agent
possessing the first-order properties. It is in virtue of the higher-order property that the
first-order dispositional properties are notmere bits of accidental behaviour that agents
display on occasion, but rather manifest in the way they do as an essential feature of
the agent itself. Without some such specificatory and organisational principle, what
we know to be necessitated, non-accidental, highly regular and predictable behaviour
would not, I venture to suggest, have an explanation.
So what are Tubgy’s objections to the higher-order view? The first is that ‘each and
every disposition has a further property: the property of having some manifestation
M. …these second-order properties are taken on this proposal to exist in addition to
the manifestation properties themselves. Positing these extra second-order properties
as well as the manifestation properties themselves is clearly an increase in ontologi-
cal commitment.’40 I will not spend too long on this objection since Tugby himself
realises it ‘may not strike many as conclusive’,41 particularly when the quantitative
metaphysical expansion on the higher-order view is compared to the relative lack of
qualitative parsimony on the Platonist position. Parsimony aside, I take issue with
Tugby’s characterisation of the higher-order properties themselves. He thinks that the
property of having manifestation M is all there is to such properties, with appropriate
38 Tugby (2013, pp. 472–474).
39 Ibid, pp. 454–455. A more complete account would bring in stimulus universals as well as manifestation
universals, thus linking the universal fragility to both (again speaking loosely) the universals being struck
by a force and breaking. Presumably Tugby omits stimulus universals for the sake of simplicity.
40 Ibid, p. 472.
41 Ibid, p. 472.
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variance in the manifestation type for each disposition. This jejune way of looking at
what I am considering to be final causes is calculated to make them look otiose—an
ontological spare wheel. If final causes are higher-order properties, their content is
not the mere specification of a manifestation type. Rather, it is the specification of a
substantial principle of operation that is part of the essence of the agent. The solubility
of salt itself is governed by a substantial principle of operation according to which
salt, by virtue of its essence as a certain kind of compound, behaves in a specific way
in water, albeit within a range of indifference as to the contingent circumstances of its
dissolution. Such a property—what we might call a finality property—might not be
the direct object of a natural scientist’s investigation, but for the scholastic metaphysi-
cian it is the substantial precondition of the scientist’s investigation of any first-order
dispositional properties at all.
Tugby’s second objection, on which he places greater weight, is as follows42: ‘how,
we may ask, are we to understand a disposition’s second-order property of having
manifestationM? Since this property is distinct from the manifestation property itself,
and since this property somehow enfolds within itself reference to the manifestation
property, which may not itself exist if Platonism is rejected, then these second-order
properties seem to display precisely the kind of Meinongian, quasi-intentional charac-
teristicswewereworried about in the first place.’What the advocate of the higher-order
proposal needs, he claims, is a ‘transparent account of how these second-order prop-
erties can, as non-mental entities, embody a directedness to something which may not
exist.’43 This objection, I submit, rather than adding a new substantive point is more a
statement of incredulity coupled with an implied insistence that directedness must be
a relational affair involving existing relata (on Tugby’s view, Platonic universals). As
against this, the higher-order theorist needs to stand their ground. The idea of specific
indifference, cashed out in terms of a higher-order property governing the first-order
behaviour of a power, bypasses Meinongian worries by placing directedness to a man-
ifestation within the very essence of the power bearer. It is the anxious insistence44
that directedness must be a relation, if it is to be anything comprehensible at all, that
prevents acceptance of it as constitutive of the nature of what has it. Like all critics
of ‘physical intentionality’, Tugby worries about how non-mental power bearers can
have a directedness that is supposed to be the hallmark of the mental. My contention,
however, is that the supposition itself is a mistake, leading to an ontological panic that
is avoidable by focusing instead on finality itself and the different ways in which it is
manifested in both mental and purely physical beings. Directedness is not a relation;
it is constitutive of the way in which power bearers behave in virtue of their powers.
Unless the power bearer has a relational essence—in other words, is such that to be
the kind of thing it is it must be in an actual relation to some other thing—then the
power bearer’s directedness is a wholly intrinsic affair, a matter of how it is built to
operate.
42 Ibid, p. 473.
43 Ibid, p. 473.
44 Ibid, p. 460 contra Heil.
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Let’s explore this idea a little further, examining Tugby’s worries about Aristotelian
dispositionalism generally, as against the Platonism he supports and to which Bird
also is sympathetic.45 For Tugby, directedness is a higher-order (type-level) relation
between Platonic universals. The solubility of salt, then, consists in—is identical to—a
relation between the universal solubility and the universal dissolution in water.46 The
advantage of Platonism, he claims, is that it explains two non-negotiable platitudes
about powers: (1) they can exist unmanifested; (2) they (or at least some) are intrinsic
to their possessors. As to (1), even if some or all samples of salt never dissolved in
water because they were never immersed in it or even because no water existed, they
would all still possess solubility inwater due to the guaranteed existence of the Platonic
universal dissolution in water. By contrast, on an Aristotelian (immanentist) view of
universals, such as I support, if noactualdissolution of salt inwater ever takes place, the
Aristotelian universal dissolution in water does not exist, so the higher-order relation
between the solubility and dissolution universals does not exist, so salt’s directedness,
and hence its very power, does not exist.47 Platonism respects unmanifested powers,
so the argument goes; Aristotelianism does not.
Tugby thinks, however, that the Aristotelian could bite the bullet and simply deny
the existence of unmanifested powers, that is, powers that an entity of kind K can
possess yet which have never been manifested by any Ks.48 So much for what Tugby
took to be a platitude; in any case, it is a bullet that an Aristotelian should respectfully
decline. For the problem lies notwithAristotelian dispositionalismas such, butwith the
idea that it should be explained as a relation between universals. All dispositionalists
should want to say that in the envisaged (admittedly extreme) thought experiment, salt
is as soluble in water as it ever was and also is when the manifestation universal does
exist. If positing a higher-order relation does away with this platitude then so much
for the relation, not the platitude. For Tugby, however, more important is platitude
(2)—that at least some powers are intrinsic—as far as refuting Aristotelian universals
dispositionalism is concerned. For the theory entails that if external circumstances
were to change—again, were there to be no dissolution in water, maybe no water at
all, in the history of theworld—then salt would not possess solubility inwater. So salt’s
actual solubility in water could not be intrinsic, whereas it looks about as central an
example of the platitude as any. So much, concludes Tugby, for Aristotelian universals
dispositionalism.
45 Bird (2007, Chap. 3.2).
46 I keep it simple for simplicity’s sake, avoiding the question of how exactly the universal solubility is to
be specified, as well as general worries about Platonism as opposed to particular concerns with Platonist
dispositionalism.
47 What if other dissolution-in-water events take place, not involving salt: won’t the universal still exist?
Shouldn’t the universal be dissolution of salt in water rather than dissolution in water? Again, we have to
sidestep this important question, but let’s suppose no dissolution in water, of any kind by any substance,
takes place.
48 Another complication to be sidestepped: does the Aristotelian universal only exist at time t when it is
being instantiated at t? If so, then a particular sample S of salt loses the power of solubility the moment
no dissolution is happening anywhere in the world. This seems absurd. Hence the Aristotelian universals
dispositionalist will need to liberalise their criterion of existence for universals, perhaps employing a cross-
temporal principle along the lines of Armstrong (1989, pp. 75–76).
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So much, I conclude, for the higher-order relation interpretation of Aristotelian
universals dispositionalism.Here I sidewithHeil49 and other trope theorists, for whom
the directedness of powers is in no way relational. On my theory, specific indifference
is a wholly intrinsic affair, being the way inwhich to understand the directed behaviour
of power bearers. That salt needs water in order to dissolve in it does not entail that
there must be any water for salt to be soluble, any more than my needing sounds in
order to hear entails that there must be sounds for me to have the power of hearing. So
it is not the Aristotelian part of Aristotelian universals dispositionalism that Tugby’s
argument undermines, but the universals part understood as importing a higher-order
relation into the analysis of dispositionality. To see definitively that this is so, consider
what he says about intrinsicness on his preferred Platonic universals dispositionalism.
The answer is—not much. He assents to Bird’s rather gnomic remarks50 about not
confusing the first level with the second level: directedness consists of a second-
order relation between universals, which is consistent with the intrinsic first-order
possession, by an object, of a power essentially characterised by that second-order
relation. In other words, it is possible for an object intrinsically to possess a property
that is essentially relational. Yet if salt intrinsically possesses solubility in water, and
solubility in water, as a Platonic universal, is essentially in the ‘directedness’ relation
to the Platonic manifestation universal dissolution in water, then so is salt, at the first
level, essentially in relation to the manifestation universal. So how is its possession of
solubility intrinsic after all?
Well, Tugby’s ‘rough definition’ of x’s having a property intrinsically only includes
‘independence of the existence of distinct particulars and x’s relation to them’,51 so
by that definition salt will still possess solubility intrinsically. Yet this seems to me
a gerrymandered definition: why exclude relations to Platonic universals themselves,
if only to avoid the undesirable extrinsicness result? The Platonist could respond:
salt’s relation to solubility is merely instantiation, which is a formal relation; the
relation of solubility to dissolution is merely an internal relation; so salt’s relation to
dissolution cannot, however we characterise it, be in any way a threat to salt’s intrinsic
possession of solubility. This reply strikes me as suspiciously ad hoc: what kind of
relation is it, then, between salt and the Platonic universal dissolution? It looks like
an internal relation, to be sure, since salt necessarily has it to dissolution as long as
salt is soluble (whether or not salt is necessarily soluble, moreover); but why should
this internal relation not entail salt’s possessing solubility extrinsically? Moreover,
it is rather difficult to come up with any non-dispositional example of an object’s
possessing intrinsically a property that is itself relationally defined. (Consider typical
examples such as parent or tall.) Maybe this is something special about dispositions,
but Tugby gives us no independent reason for thinking it so.
Finally, suppose this sort of objection fails. There is another problem for Platonic
universals dispositionalism, one that looks fatal. For consider: on the one hand, for
salt to be soluble it must instantiate a universal that is related to the distinct universal
49 Heil (2003, Chaps. 8.4–8.6).
50 Bird (2007, pp. 140–141).
51 Tugby (2013, p. 465).
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dissolution. But when salt actually dissolves, it also must instantiate the universal
solubility that is related to the distinct universal dissolution. So how are we to dis-
tinguish, as dispositionalists must, between manifestability and actual manifestation,
i.e. between the very actuality and potentiality that mark out the dispositionalist posi-
tion? The answer, of course, is for the Platonist to point out that the relation holding
between the universals, whether or not any salt is actually dissolving, is the internal
‘directedness’ relation; but when some salt actually dissolves, the universals take on
an extra, external relation, say the relation of co-instantiation. The worry, then, is that
the Platonist is appealing to the very concept of directedness that he was trying to
define in terms of a relation between universals. Instead of defining it in terms of the
relevant relation, however, he ends up defining the relation in terms of it. How is this
progress? He can say that the directedness relation is just the relation of definability,
or some identity-involving relation; but so does the non-relationalist. After all, on
my position, solubility is of course partly defined in terms of dissolution! But I do
not appeal to necessarily existing universals to explain directedness, and treat it as
a wholly non-relational affair. So how has the Platonist made any advance? On the
contrary, they have violated the razor that Ockham should have proposed: do not mul-
tiply mysteries beyond necessity. Directedness is, to be sure, something of a mystery,
one I seek partially to clarify. But why take on this mystery as well as the mystery
of Platonism given that the Platonist position does nothing at all to clarify the first
mystery but instead relies on it? On my account, directedness is a first-order, intrinsic
feature of the concrete world, the irreducible finality without which we can explain
very little. On the Platonist account, indeed on any relational account, we still have
irreducible directedness, albeit at the second level, and now it becomes a more mys-
terious, relational affair. And for the Platonist in particular, the second-order mystery
of directedness detaches itself from the world of the concrete altogether. We should
try to minimise our mysteries.
So how does directedness fit into the broad picture of potentiality as specific indif-
ference? I have said nothing about ‘pointing’, ‘aiming at’, and the like. Bird, following
Mumford,worries thatwe should have to attribute intentionality to vectors, or to falling
rocks that are ‘directed’ to the road below. Yet this is a confusion born of the woolli-
ness of the term ‘directed’. The direction of a falling rock is purely a spatio-temporal
notion; that of a vector may be spatio-temporal, otherwise physical, or purely logical
or mathematical. All of these are ways in which powers can be manifested, but the
directedness of the power itself is always a matter of specific indifference, a concept
that carries no essentially spatio-temporal, physical, or other connotation. Rocks have
specific indifference: the power to resist an imposed force is essential to inertial mass.
Rocks resist imposed forces, they do not vanish; but the way in which a particular
rock resists a particular force depends on the rock, the force, and the circumstances.
Similarly, falling to the centre of the Earth is essential to an object, such as a rock,
with gravitational mass and within the Earth’s gravitational field. But whether it falls
in the spatio-temporal direction of a road or a stream is a matter of indifference, not
specificity. Its particular direction is not its directedness but a manifestation of its
directedness, that is, a manifestation of its specific indifference. Again, it is superflu-
ous to metaphysical requirements that there be any ‘aiming’, ‘striving’, ‘planning’, or
any concept of that to which the object with a given power is specifically indifferent.
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This was never the right way to read either Aristotle or for that matter Aquinas, but it
remains the distorting Galilean–Cartesian–Spinozistic lens through which the history
of ideas was—and continues to be—misread.
Two further points should be made before concluding this section. To recap the
general point first: a good way of understanding directedness is in terms of finality;
and a good way of understanding finality is in terms of specific indifference. Specific
indifference is always a way of understanding the essence of an object. The first
additional point, then, is that this is so whether directedness involves the essence more
or less generically. Mammals have mass, and as such can shatter windows, but if poor
Bessie the cow is launched at a pane of glass the power she manifests involves her
essence more generically (no consolation to her) than the power she manifests when
feeding her young. The more completely an essence is involved in the manifestation
of an object’s power, the less generic (more specific) is the involvement of the essence.
The second point is that directedness can involve powers that are either essential or
contingent. Mellor’s example of water is one illustration52: hot water dissolves more
compounds more rapidly than cold water, though the temperature of the water is
contingent; still, in both cases the specific indifference displayed by its solvent power
derives from its essence, which is given in part by its molecular structure. Again, an
object that is only contingently red has the contingent power of reflecting light of a
certain wavelength; but the directedness of that power derives from the object’s power
of reflecting whatever wavelength corresponds to the colour it actually has—and this
is essential. This second case is one of remote and proximate involvement of essence.
The contingent red-involving power derives more remotely from the essence of the
coloured object than the necessary light-reflecting power.
Having sought to remove some of the spookiness surrounding ‘directedness’, I now
turn to the equally dark notion of ‘inexistence’.
4 Inexistence: failures of exportation and truth
WhenBrentano spokeof ‘intentional inexistence’ [intentionale Inexistenz],53 hemeant
the ‘esse intentionale’, the ‘intentional existence’ or ‘intentional being’ of the scholas-
tic philosophers. Since one of the oft-cited features of intentionality is that intentional
objects need not exist (a child’s thoughts about the Tooth Fairy, my wondering about
the future prime minister), ‘inexistence’ has come in many quarters to be equated with
‘non-existence’, inasmuch as commentators have taken intentional inexistence simply
to be that feature of intentionality whereby intentional objects need not have real exis-
tence54 (what the scholastics sometimes called ‘esse reale’ or ‘esse naturale’). The
move is natural but a misunderstanding nevertheless. The ‘inexistence’ of Brentano
and the scholastics pertains more to directedness than to possible non-existence. Pos-
sible non-existence is, however, a consequence of inexistence: it is more helpfully
52 Mellor (1991, p. 107).
53 Brentano (1995/1874, p. 68).
54 Place (1996, pp. 92, 100) is guilty of this conflation.
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considered in terms of the failure of quantifier exportation55 and/or permissible falsity
of a proposition embedded within an intentional context.56 Just as my desire for world
peace does not entail that there is or everwill beworld peace, somywonderingwhether
it will rain tomorrow does not entail that it will rain tomorrow. Having clarified this,
for simple convenience’s sake I will now use the term ‘inexistence’ as a shorthand for
failure of exportation and/or permissible falsity.
A little consideration demonstrates that for all the apparent centrality of inexistence
to intentionality, it is by nomeans essential to it and so fails to be a ‘mark of themental’;
philosophers have arguably wasted a lot of time discussing it in this context, and may
even have seriously distorted the whole debate. For a start, propositions embedded
in the modal context ‘It is possible that…’ are also permissibly false, and if they
are existentially quantified then exportation fails.57 Even if (itself questionable) ‘It is
possible that…’ creates a context that is intensional with an ‘s’, it is not an intentional
context whether mental or physical. The same goes for ‘It is probable that…’, at least
if probability is interpreted objectively (that is, as having nothing to do with belief).
Failure of exportation/existential generalisation and permissible falsity can be found
where there is no intentionality of any sort, and conversely neither of them apply in
certain contexts that are clearly intentional, namely those created by factives.58 (1)
Exportation/existential generalisation is clearly valid in the case of factives where the
complement is a direct object, such as ‘S knows x’ (knowledge by acquaintance), ‘S
sees x’, ‘S hears x’, ‘S is aware of x’, ‘S realises x’.59 (2) Permissible falsity fails, and
so truth is entailed, in the case of factives with a propositional complement, such as
‘S knows that p’, ‘S realises that p’, ‘S regrets that p’. I for one see no room for debate
about at least some sensory verbs, properly understood in their context; even if we had
to disambiguate ‘see’, for instance, so as to separate factive from non-factive cases,
the former would be sufficient to make the point. But even if no sensory verbs were
either factive or had a factive interpretation, it is beyond question that ‘know’ is both
factive and creates an intentional context, and only one case is needed. I will leave it as
intuitively clear for now that ‘know’ is intentional, adding merely that intensionality
55 As well as the failure of existential generalisation. The basic idea is that from, say, ‘Fred is scared of
a vampire’ we cannot infer ‘There is a vampire of which Fred is scared’ (we cannot export the existential
quantifier from within the context of the verb to a position outside the context of the verb). In addition,
we cannot infer from ‘Fred loves Zeus’ to ‘There is someone Fred loves’ (failure of existential generali-
sation). Possible non-existence, then, prevents there being general rules allowing exportation or existential
generalisation in the context of intentional verbs.
56 Martin and Pfeifer (1986); Lycan (1969); Chisholm (1957, pp. 170–171).
57 Well, I am assuming that the Barcan formula is false for evidently compelling metaphysical reasons,
irrespective of any formal questions about the best system of modal logic. If it is possible that there are
golden mountains, it does not follow that there is anything that is possibly a golden mountain—if, say, only
a mountain is in the running for possibly being golden, and if no non-golden mountain ever could have
been golden or ever could become golden without being replaced by a numerically different mountain. (If
you don’t like this example, others are easy to conceive.)
58 Or, more narrowly, ‘verbs of cognitive achievement’, as Place puts it (1996, p. 107).
59 Examples: ‘Fred sees Gail’ entails ‘There is someone Fred sees’ (generalisation); ‘Fred sees someone
beautiful’ entails ‘There is someone beautiful whom Fred sees’ (exportation).
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with an ‘s’ has something to do with it60—but this is only the surface of the story, as
we shall see.
Not only does inexistence fail as a ‘mark of the mental’, but it also fails as a
‘mark of the dispositional’, to use Place’s phrase: in other words, there is no general
phenomenon of failure of exportation/existential generalisation or permissible falsity
in respect of powers. Martin and Pfeifer, endorsed by Place, make much of the fact
that many power ascriptions do not entail the truth of the manifestation condition
embedded within the relevant context or implied by the ascription, nor the existence
of one or more of the objects that are essential to the fulfilment of the condition. (1)
‘This vase is fragile’ does not entail ‘This glass will break’ (i.e., that it will break at
any time, let alone any particular time, in its actual career). (2) ‘This glass is capable
of being smashed only by a one kilogram rock’ does not entail ‘There exists a one
kilogram rock’. (3) ‘Protons attract electrons’ does not entail ‘There are electrons’.61
(4) ‘Acid can turn this litmus paper red’ does not entail ‘This litmus paper will turn
red’.
What physical intentionalists overlook, however, is that there are powers whose
manifestations are guaranteed. (1) ‘All men are mortal’ entails ‘This man will die’.
(2) ‘Uranium 238 has a half-life of 4.5 billion years’ entails ‘On average, fifty per cent
of this sample of uranium 238 measured at time t will have decayed at t+4.5 billion
years.’ A few remarks about these examples are in order.62 First, (1) might look like
a mere logical claim rather than a power ascription, but it is the latter. It is also not
a mere description of what happens to befall all humans, nor even of a physically
or metaphysically necessary connection between humans and mortality. It is, rather,
shorthand for the ascription of a power to humans—obviously not an active power
since dying is not an action, but a passive power, namely the potentiality concerning
what happens to all humans in virtue of their very essence.63 Secondly, it might be
argued that (2) is not a power ascription since it ascribes no power to any particular
entity: half-lives concern radioactive elements in general, but there is no metaphysical
‘trickle down’ to any individual isotope. This is not quite right, however, since each
isotope, simply in virtue of being an instance of the kind with the relevant half-life,
must have some power of decay instantiating the power of the kind; it’s just that
whether and when this power will be manifested is, so physics tells us, in principle
unpredictable. Even if true, though, this will not make my point since I am arguing
60 Both Chisholm (1957, p. 171) and Place (1996, p. 107) recognise this, but as we shall see the story goes
deeper than mere intensionality.
61 Compare ‘Protons are attracting electrons’.
62 One specious objection is easily disposed of, namely that all bearers of a given power can be wiped out
before the power manifests, so no power can have a guaranteed manifestation. Reply: (i) if the manifestation
is precisely ceasing to exist, as with human mortality, then wiping out the power-bearers is one way of
manifesting the power. (ii) For powers with guaranteed manifestations that do not consist simply of ceasing
to exist (e.g. radioactive half-lives), ‘guaranteed to manifest’ means ‘guaranteed to manifest as long as the
power-bearer exists’.
63 Needless to say, the real distinction between active and passive powers is not an easy one to make out.
It might plausibly be argued that if there is any distinction to be had here it is merely conceptual. Although
I believe the real distinction can be made out there is no space for a detailed defence.
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that in the case of (2) permissible falsity fails; but if the power I am appealing to is
the individual power of an arbitrary isotope the argument itself fails, since it is always
permissibly false, of any individual isotope of U 238, that it will decay at t+4.5 bil-
lion years. Rather, the correct appeal is to the power of the kind, Uranium 238. This
does descend to any given sample, so we could just as well appeal to the power of
the sample, insisting that there are powers of kinds, and even powers of samples of
kinds, that do not descend to individual instances of the kind in question. In the case
of radioactive decay this seems to be what the physics forces us to say, as long as we
are not sceptics about powers in the first place. And it will be enough to make the
point that permissible falsity fails here. The third point is that the failure of permissi-
ble falsity has nothing to do with the existence, if there be such, of so-called ‘surefire
dispositions’, ones whose manifestation is produced deterministically:64 the existence
of radioactive decay, which involves a guaranteed manifestation that is nonetheless
indeterministic, proves the point.65 Rather, the failure derives from the essences of
certain kinds of thing. The powers they have, however completely or incompletely,
and however proximately or remotely, are bound to be manifested.66 This is no more
an issue of determinism than that all reptiles have hearts or that objects with mass exert
gravitational force on each other.67 Even when causation is part of what the power’s
manifestation consists in, as it usually is, the question of whether the causation at
hand is deterministic is distinct from whether the manifestation is necessary given the
existence of the power.
The upshot of this section is that ‘intentional inexistence’, interpreted as permissible
falsity and/or failure of quantifier exportation or existential generalisation, looks like
a bright red herring when it comes to comparing mental intentionality and physical
powers. In both cases it sometimes applies and sometimes does not. This no more sug-
gests a metaphysically interesting similarity between the two than the mere occasional
sharing of some feature points to a metaphysically interesting similarity between don-
keys and diamonds. That said, however, factives and their physical analogues in cases
of guaranteedmanifestation do after all help us to home in onwhat reallymatters when
it comes to mental intentionality, and reinforce the picture of finality as underlying
both the mental and the physical.
64 This is the standard interpretation of Prior et al.’s ‘causally operative sufficient condition’ for manifes-
tation (1982, p. 251).
65 We should not be misled by the fact that the manifestation, in the case of radioactive half-lives, is
probabilistic. The strict definition of half-life is that, on average, half of the isotopes of a given sample will
have decayed by the end of the relevant time. It is not just the probabilistic nature of the decay that requires
this stipulation, but also the fact that some samples have an odd number of isotopes. The manifestation of
the decay power, albeit a phenomenon that occurs on average, is guaranteed. Suppose that a given animal
population was guaranteed to have, on average, 2.3 offspring per female: the manifestation would not be
deprived of its guarantee just because it was an actuality that obtained on average.
66 A surefire or deterministic disposition, on the other hand—say, of a given object to fall when dropped—is
bound to manifest only if the stimulus is present.
67 We should not get exercised here about ceteris paribus conditions and all the ways in which powers
can be blocked. A metaphysically satisfying story about these can be told, one that is consistent with the
necessity of manifestation of certain powers. For more, see Oderberg (2011).
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5 Intensionality with an ‘s’
We know that both factives and powers with guaranteed manifestations violate
‘intentional inexistence’ interpreted as failure of exportation/existential generalisation
and/or permissible falsity. Still, both display finality understood as specific indiffer-
ence. Powers with guaranteed manifestations, like all powers, have as part of their
essence a specific range of manifestations within which the power is indifferent to the
circumstances in which a manifestation within the range occurs. More properly and
significantly, we should perform what might be called ‘objectual descent’ and speak
of the power possessors rather than the powers on their own: bearers of powers display
specific indifference in virtue of the powers they bear.
As to factives like ‘know’, they too can be assimilated to other cases of mental
intentionality: factivity makes them no less intentional than mental acts and states
complying with inexistence such as wanting, hoping, and fearing. The question then
is: do all these mental acts and states display specific indifference? As I will discuss
in more detail later, mental acts and states are not themselves powers. Humans68 have
the power of knowing, desiring, hoping for, and fearing things, but these powers (all
instances of the rational power) are not the same as their exercise. On the contrary, the
exercise of the intentional powers looks like their manifestation, and manifestations
are actualities, not potentialities. So the very suggestion that there should be physical
intentionality in powers as a straight metaphysical carry-over from mental intention-
ality understood as the manifestation of intentional powers looks doomed from the
start.
Yet for all that this may be a problem, we can still affirm that mental intentionality,
whether factive or not, in its actual state—the very exercise of the intentional powers—
does display finality understood as specific indifference, and this is where we begin to
find the key to what really distinguishes the mental from the physical (at least where
the mental is understood as rational mentality, as it is here).69 The way through to an
answer goes via intensionality with an ‘s’. Now both Bird70 and Place71 argue, contra
both Molnar72 and Martin and Pfeifer,73 that parallels to the intensionality with an
‘s’ that we find in contexts of mental intentionality cannot also be found in physical
powers. We are familiar with such truisms as that from
(1) Andrew believes that George Eliot wrote Middlemarch
68 The only rational agents I am considering for now, though I will broaden the analysis later.
69 Note that in speaking of a mental act or actuality’s displaying finality I am not suggesting the act has its
own finality distinct in kind from the underlying mental power manifested by the act. There is one kind of
finality (captured, as we will see, by the phenomenon of abstraction) but in the case of a mental act finality
is displayed by the exercise of a mental power that possesses finality. To put it the other way, the hallmark of
mental powers is their specific kind of finality, the kind of finality that is manifested or displayed when the
mental power is exercised. Similarly, the finality displayed by the actual breakage of a glass when struck
is possessed by the glass’s fragility, which is a power, and hence by the glass itself, which bears the power.
70 Bird (2007, pp. 121–123).
71 Place (1996, pp. 108–112).
72 Molnar (2003, pp. 64–46).
73 Martin and Pfeifer (1986, pp. 532–533).
123
Synthese
(2) George Eliot is Mary Ann Evans
it does not follow that
(3) Andrew believes that Mary Ann Evans wrote Middlemarch
unless he also believes thatMaryAnnEvans isGeorgeEliot. Itwould benigh incredible
that anything similar could be found in the case of powers. Molnar’s example is:74
(4) Acid has the power to turn this piece of litmus paper red
(5) Red is the colour of post boxes
(6) Acid has the power to turn this piece of litmus paper the colour of post boxes.
Molnar claims that (6) does not follow from (4) and (5). It is evident, though, that if
‘the colour of post boxes’ is interpreted rigidly as ‘the actual colour of post boxes’ then
acid certainly has the power to turn litmus paper that colour. We only hear (6) as not
following from (4) and (5) if ‘the colour of post boxes’ is interpreted as ‘the colour of
post boxes, whatever that colour happens to be’. As Bird succinctly puts it,75 acid has
no power that tracks the colour of post boxes. So the parallel with the belief example
fails: intensionality with an ‘s’ still applies in the latter case despite the rigidity of the
relevant referring terms.
Of more interest, perhaps, is Martin and Pfeifer’s attempt to prove physical inten-
sionality with an ‘s’:
(7) Acid A was able to turn litmus paper P into the only pink object O at location L
(8) The only pink object O at location L is the only object M of mass f at L
do not entail
(9) Acid Awas able to turn litmus paper P into the only objectM ofmass f at location
L.
Place has a rather convoluted response to this gnarly example, arguing in the alternative
as follows.76 (i) Even if this example demonstrates physical intensionality with an
‘s’, all the terms in the complement are singular, whereas intensionality with an ‘s’
in mental contexts applies also to general terms but this has no physical analogue.
(ii) Even if intensionality with an ‘s’ only applies to co-referring singular terms this
example does not demonstrate physical intensionality with an ‘s’ because the putative
power of acid A is no power at all, due to its being wholly limited to a particular object,
and a particular event, at a particular place, whereas genuine powers are ‘open-ended’.
Place’s objections are easy to dispose of. Taking (ii) first, it is easy to insert a range
of manifestation conditions along some dimension, thus endowing the alleged power
of acid A with some ‘open-endedness’ and thus qualifying it as genuine, for instance:
(7*) Acid A was able to turn litmus paper P into the only pink object O at location
L at any time ti between times t1. . .tn
74 With numbering changed from the original.
75 Bird (2007, p. 122).
76 Place (1996, pp. 108–112).
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(8*) The only pink object O at location L at any time ti between times t1. . .tn is
the only object M of mass f at L at any time ti between times t1. . .tn
which still do not entail
(9*) Acid A was able to turn litmus paper P into the only object M of mass f at
location L at any time ti between times t1. . .tn.
In other words, it does not appear essential to Martin and Pfeifer’s example that it be
wholly particularised in the way they make it. Returning now to Place’s objection (i),
consider that:
(10) Poison P was able to turn red squirrels into sick red squirrels
(11) Sick red squirrels are native British squirrels
do not entail
(12) Poison P was able to turn red squirrels into native British squirrels.
Here only general terms are used in the complement of the power context, yet although
they co-refer, substitution fails to preserve truth. Further, ‘sick red squirrels’ is being
used rigidly, as in ‘the actual sick red squirrels’, namely the ones that, in the imagined
case, are the familiar British ones. Similarly, ‘native British squirrels’ is being used
rigidly to refer to the familiar British ones, not to native British squirrels whatever kind
that may happen to be in an arbitrary possible world (such as one in which the grey
squirrels are native). Moreover, Place’s objection has nothing to do with general terms
referring to essential kinds rather than accidental kinds: any general term will do, and
‘sick red squirrel’ is a perfectly kosher general term. In any case, we can stipulate
further so that the general terms all refer to essential kinds (rather, the one essential
kind): suppose P turned every red squirrel sickwithout exception; suppose the sickness
to be a minor genetic mutation expressed as a relatively insignificant but permanent
functional disability; and suppose the mutation to be part of the heritable genome;
then we can be sure (11) is true, in other words that there is genuine co-reference to
one and only one kind, and an essential kind at that. Yet we still rightly deny that P
turned sick squirrels into native British squirrels.
Does this meanMartin and Pfeifer are vindicated—that not only have they provided
a legitimate example of physical intensionality with an ‘s’ involving singular terms,
but that a parallel one can be constructed using general terms, contra Place? Not at all,
because the failure of the inference to go through in both (7)–(9) and (10)–(12) has
nothing to do with intensionality with an ‘s’ and everything to do with John Buridan’s
‘raw meat’ sophism77:
(13) Yesterday you bought raw meat
(14) What you bought is what you ate
(15) You ate raw meat.
77 This is the second sophism of Chap. 4 of his Summulae de Dialectica: Buridan (2001, p. 877).
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Now (15) evidently does not follow from (13) and (14); the question is why. There
is, perhaps surprisingly, a fair bit of debate about precisely what the fallacy is, with
general agreement that it is either, or closely related to, the fallacy of secundum quid,
which is itself the same as, or closely related to, the fallacy of accident.78 For our
purposes, it is enough to observe that the raw meat fallacy derives from a failure to
take into account the fact that the meat was cooked before it was eaten: you ate meat,
to be sure, but one of its characteristics had changed between the time you bought
it and the time you ate it. This is sufficient to enable diagnosis of why both Martin
and Pfeifer’s putative case of physical intensionality with an ‘s’ (7–9, the acid and the
litmus paper) and my parallel case using general terms (10–12, the red squirrels) are
fallacious. In the acid example, the fallacy derives from a failure to take into account
the fact that the litmus paper was the only objectM ofmass f at L before the acid acted
on it. In the squirrel example, the fallacy derives from the failure to take into account
the fact that the red squirrels were native British squirrels before the poison acted
on them. In the raw meat sophism, there is a failure to take into account something
that has changed; in the acid and squirrel fallacies, the failure is to take into account
something that has stayed the same. Here we have a unified diagnosis (albeit informal)
of all three fallacies, with no need to invoke, and no obvious role for, putative physical
intensionality with an ‘s’ in the latter two. (And we certainly should not think that
Buridan’s sophism proves ‘ate’ to be intensional!)
We have, I submit, enough material to show that physical intensionality with an
‘s’ is illusory. This leads naturally to the thought—which, as we shall see, I deny—
that intensionality with an ‘s’ is, in the end, what distinguishes the mental from the
physical. As we saw, both factives and guaranteed manifestations of physical powers
demonstrate that their correlative contexts violate exportation/generalisation and/or
permissible falsity. Both, however, display finality as specific indifference as much
as do non-factives and powers with non-guaranteed manifestations. Uranium 238’s
half-life is indifferent to whether any individual isotope decays at all and hence to
which 50% of a given sample will decay according to the half-life, as well as to the
spatial location of any sample manifesting the half-life. Humanmortality is indifferent
to which humans there are, when, where and how they die. The specific indifference
of such powers seems to be on all fours with that of all the rest.
When it comes to factives such as knowing, seeing, regretting, and the like, the
finality displayed is like that of non-factives such as believing, wanting, and hoping.
But in what way do any of these mental states or acts display finality understood as
specific indifference? The general answer is that they all, without exception, involve
thinking about the object of the state or act in some ways rather than others. The
special answer in each case is that for any particular mental act or state M and object
O involving finality, the subject of that act or stateMs about O in someways rather than
others. This is not merely a matter of the ‘descriptive character of much thought and in
particular the fact that descriptions may be incomplete’,79 but of the incompleteness
of thought generally, at least for finite rational beings such as ourselves. And it is not
78 For an interesting discussion, see Walton (1990).
79 Bird (2007, p. 125).
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just that thought is incomplete, but that it must be incomplete if there is to be any
thought at all—just as finality in the physical world is a precondition for any efficient
causation whatsoever.
If I know that George Eliot wrote Middlemarch but not that Mary Ann Evans did
so, then there is a certain descriptive incompleteness in my thought about either the
person George Eliot/Mary Ann Evans, or the novel, or both. A child might wonder
whether 2 + 2 = 4 without wondering whether the sum of 2 and 2 is the second even
number, again due to descriptive incompleteness in thought,which is better categorised
as incompleteness of information. But a person might also know something directly
(‘by acquaintance’), say a particular shade of red, without knowing it in all possible
lighting conditions and all possible colour contexts. Here, we stipulate that there is
no descriptive lack, and hence no information gap if we restrict information to what
can be described. But if knowing something directly counts as information without
description, then knowing the shade of red but not under all possible conditions also
counts as a lack of information.
The same line of thinking cuts us further adrift from intensionality with an ‘s’ pure
and simple (understood in terms of referential opacity and failure of substitutability),
and even from lack of information, when we consider highly general thoughts such
as the thought that something might happen, that someone is in the room, or that
everything that happens has a purpose. Trying to find intensional contexts here involves
Procrustean manoeuvres that serve little purpose in advancing our understanding. The
same, I would argue, goes for simple, non-descriptive singular thoughts such as Jane’s
thinking about John—not thinking anything in particular, just pondering him or having
him before her mind’s eye, as it were. True, if John is the local bank robber it does not
follow that Jane is thinking about the local bank robber unless she knows the identity,
butwhat is gained by the observation?One can ponder things, turn themaround in one’s
mind, gaze at them either internally or with a physical eye—all acts of intentionality.
Whether we go on to characterise all such acts and states as intensional with an ‘s’,
inasmuch as one can produce canonical forms for them in which an intentional verb
takes a complement within which referential opacity, or some failure of substitution
salva veritate, can be demonstrated, depends on how far we are willing to distort both
mind and language for the cause. Given that the cause is understanding intentionality,
and hence at least part of the essence of mind, I doubt that such contortions will give
us what we need.
Intensionalitywith an ‘s’ clearly features inmost typical cases ofmental intentional-
ity, factives included. And it would bewrong to dismiss its relevance for understanding
the mental as opposed to the physical, as Searle does.80 Place is right to insist that
intensionality with an ‘s’ is not the essence distinguishing the mental from the phys-
ical, but again overly dismissive in suggesting that it ‘arises only in the case of a
quotation of what someone has said or would be expected to say, where to make such
a substitution is liable to misrepresent what has been or would be said.’81 Even if
Place is right about the essential link between intensionality with an ‘s’ and quotation
80 Searle (1983, p. 24).
81 Place (1996, p. 119).
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(a question we need not resolve here), to think that there is no essential link between
quotation and the mental is bizarre. We cannot begin to understand why quotational
contexts are intensional with an ‘s’ without a grasp of the way in which what a person
says or might say represents or expresses what they believe, wonder about, suppose,
desire, and the like.
The problem with intensionality with an ‘s’, then, is not that it has nothing to do
with intentionality, that it is a diversion or that emphasising it hampers our attempt to
grasp the essence of themental, but that by concentrating on it wemerely scratch about
on the surface of something far deeper. To this extent, I would argue that Elizabeth
Anscombe was closer to the truth when she posited the ‘possible indeterminacy of the
[intentional] object’ as one of the ‘connected features’ of ‘intentional objects’.82 The
other two features are ‘possible non-existence’ (inexistence) and ‘non-substitutability’
(intensionalitywith an ‘s’, referential opacity), butwhat is interesting is that she is clear
enough that these two features derive from, aremade possible by, the first. That is, what
Anscombe calls ‘indeterminacy’ is for her of primary importance in understanding
intentionality. And although the terms ‘abstract’ and ‘abstraction’ appear nowhere in
her analysis, I claim that these are precisely what she means by indeterminacy.83 The
positionwe have arrived at, then, is that both physical powers andmental intentionality
display finality, understood as specific indifference. It is no surprise, then, that many
of the features to which theorists of intentionality have traditionally been drawn are
found in both cases—the very fact exploited by some power theorists in defence of the
thesis of ‘physical intentionality’. Intensionality with an ‘s’, however, despite some
ingenious attempts, fails to carry over to the physical. This is because intensionality
most clearly and intimately reflects, or is a classic symptom of, the fundamental mental
process of abstraction, for which there is no correlate among the physical powers. Yet
intensionality with an ‘s’ is not always found where there is abstraction at work, unless
we stretch the former term to the point of its losing any distinctive interest. We must
now turn to abstraction itself, as essential to intentionality, in order to see conclusively
how mental and physical finality differ.
6 Abstraction
It was always problematic to think of powers as having intentionality because the
mental states to which the same intentionality is attributed are not themselves powers,
even though they presuppose and depend on a range of mental powers. This is not to
deny that some mental states are best thought of as dispositional rather than occurrent
(in the classical terminology, potentialities rather than actualities). Perhaps every kind
of mental state has both dispositional and occurrent instances; knowledge might be
one example. Yet it will not do for the physical intentionalist to retrench by limiting
their thesis to dispositional mental states only, so as to preserve the analogy with
82 Anscombe (2002/1965, p. 58).
83 Note that Martin and Pfeifer, as well as Molnar, place great weight on indeterminacy in their accounts
of physical intentionality, but what they mean is significantly different from what I claim Anscombe had in
mind. I criticise their accounts in the next section.
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the purely physical. After all, the claim under consideration is that intentionality is
not the hallmark of the mental but is common to the physical; to restrict the mental
states under consideration to the dispositional only seems arbitrary and lacking in
independent motivation. Physical intentionalists muddy the waters by a liberal use of
dispositional language in the analysis of intentionality, perhaps because it makes their
case intuitively more appealing: if mental intentionality is itself a feature of mental
dispositions, why should we be surprised to find physical intentionality in physical
dispositions? Place goes as far as to claim that ‘[a]ll mental states, it turns out, are
dispositional in nature.’84 It is not Place’s lack of argument for this sweeping claim
that is the problem, but that it is patently false. Fred’s thought about birds—the thought
he has right here, right now, as he watches them through his binoculars—is manifestly
not dispositional inasmuch as it is not a power. It is an actuality, something in which
Fred is actually engaged. It might be dispositional in the sense that Fred could not
have the thought without being disposed to respond in various ways to linguistic
or environmental stimuli. Actual mental states all entail the existence of correlative
powers, if the general thesis I argued for earlier is correct. At its most basic, no one
thinks without having the power to think. But the actual thought is not the power, it is
a manifestation of the power, an exercise of it; and this manifestation is an actuality.85
So we should never have expected intentionality as the mark of an actuality—of
actual thoughts—to be also the mark of a potentiality, that is, of (physical) powers.
Actuality and potentiality are fundamentally different kinds of being. To forget this
risks being misled into conceiving of unmanifested powers as somehow ‘thinking’
about their possible manifestations, just the worry that produces atavistic fears of
animismor panpsychism in the opponents of physical intentionality. Either the physical
intentionalist is forced to treat actual mental states as potentialities, which they are
not; or he is compelled to regard physical potentialities as actualities—states of actual,
thought-like behaviour by powers—which, again, they are not.
The debate over physical intentionality, then, has caused metaphysicians to look in
the wrong place when comparing and contrasting the mental and the physical. Instead,
we should be focusing on the phenomenon of abstraction. There is a lot of confusion
84 Place (1996, p. 116).
85 Once again, note my assumption of a real distinction between powers and actualities. The pan-
dispositionalist is unlikely to be impressed given that she will consider a thought to be just another power,
not a genuine actuality. Still, one can accept that in virtue of Fred’s thought about birds he has various dis-
positions, including the disposition to have further thoughts. That is not only compatible with my position
but an integral part of it. But the pan-dispositionalist idea that, strictly, the thought is a disposition is, as I
have argued earlier, a mistake. Moreover, the pan-dispositionalist cannot escape so easily the force of my
insistence on a disanalogy between the mental and the physical. For the whole appeal of the analogy drawn
by physical intentionalists in the first place rests on the idea that physical powers interestingly resemble
mental states in respect of directedness. This presupposes that mental states are sufficiently different from
physical powers to make for an interesting and enlightening analogy. If, on the other hand, mental states
are just more powers, where is the analogy at all? What is so special about the mental? It is hard to see, on
pan-dispositionalism, how the intentionality of thought could cast any light on the directedness of powers
if thoughts are themselves just more powers whose directedness is sought to be explained in the first place.
In effect, this raises a dilemma for the physical intentionalist: either mental states and physical powers are
too dissimilar to be assimilated at any level deeper than their common finality (my position); or they are too
similar for one to cast any light on the other (as pan-dispositionalism seems to imply). Either way, there is
no genuine analogy.
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and unintended obfuscation when it comes to considering abstraction and its role, if
any, in the debate over ‘physical intentionality’. For a start, there is the potential for
misunderstanding in the terminology itself. Abstraction in a thought does not entail that
the thought is about anything abstract in the sense of ‘abstract object’. Indeterminacy
in thought (a term used both by supporters of physical intentionality, such as Molnar
and Martin & Pfeifer, and by opponents such as Bird) neither implies that a thought
is vague in the sense of having an unclear content, nor that it has a content involving
‘borderline’ cases, nor that if a thought is about something with ‘borderline’ cases the
vagueness of the thought is anything additional to the vagueness of what the thought
is about.
There is also a muddle in what philosophers have said about the role of abstraction
both in intentionality per se and in the debate over physical intentionality—Anscombe
herself being no exception. She famously observes: ‘the descriptions under which you
intend what you do can be vague, indeterminate. (You mean to put the book down on
the table all right, and you do so, but you do not mean to put it down anywhere in
particular on the table—though you do put it down somewhere in particular.)’86 Using
‘vague’ and ‘indeterminate’ interchangeably does not help the cause of understanding:
there is nothing vague about intending to put a book down on a table, unless onewishes
to soritify87 the boundaries of the table, which is evidently not what Anscombemeans.
Nor is the content in anyway unclear.When youmean to put a book down on a table the
only indeterminacy is in the abstraction involved in the thought: no particular location
on the table is within the scope of your intent; anywhere will do. Consider how hard it
would be to form the intention, let alone communicate or execute it, if you tried (per
impossibile) to eliminate all abstraction: ‘I mean to put the book here on the table, and
by “here” I mean…’ with no prescinding at all from particular spatial co-ordinates of
any kind. Whereas the original intention is perfectly non-vague, trying to eliminate
abstraction positively introduces vagueness where there was none before. You simply
must abstract, thinking of your book and/or table in some ways rather than others.
Molnar too,88 as Bird notes,89 sees indeterminacy in physical powers as paral-
leling two kinds of indeterminacy in mental intentionality—‘borderline’ cases and
incompleteness of descriptive content. The first, as I noted, is in no way essential to
intentionality (except insofar as ‘borderline’ cases can be conjured up in everything
under and including the sun) and in no way the same as abstraction. But Molnar
confuses matters further by alleging an analogy between indeterminacy as descrip-
tive incompleteness in thought and indeterminism as found in powers with essentially
probabilistic manifestations such as radioactive decay. There is nothing incomplete
in the half-life of U 238 even though no event or object, so physics tells us, causally
necessitates the decay of any particular isotope at any particular time. In any case, as
I have also argued, the finality displayed by intentionality does not require descriptive
incompleteness.
86 Anscombe (2002/1965, p. 56).
87 I apologise for not being able to think of a better term for ‘apply a sorites argument to’.
88 Molnar (2003, p. 64).
89 Bird (2007, pp. 124–125).
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Things getmore interesting, however—andwe get closer to the heart of thematter—
when considering the sort of idea Martin and Pfeifer have in mind when they appeal
to Anscombe’s other famous observation90: ‘I can think of a man without thinking
of a man of any particular height; I cannot hit a man without hitting a man of some
particular height, because there is no such thing as a man of no particular height. And
the possibility of this indeterminacy makes it possible that when I am thinking of a
particular man, not every true description of him is one under which I am thinking
of him.’ Martin and Pfeifer note91 that what Anscombe must mean is that ‘when I
am thinking of a man who has a particular height, I need not be thinking of him in
terms of his particular height.’ True enough, but it cannot be all she means: for I can
also think of a man without thinking of a man of any particular height if I am not
thinking of a ‘particular, existing, man’92 but rather thinking of some man or other, as
in ‘Think of a man, and what he would do if…’ or ‘Think of a man; now think of him
with a red beard’. (Maybe the latter request is part of a children’s game.) Both kinds
of thought involve abstraction—that necessary incompleteness of thought involving
thinking of something in some ways rather than others, which includes but is not
exhausted by prescinding from certain possible components of content that would add
further information to the thought.
Now the reason I mention both interpretations of Anscombe’s remark—mutually
consistent and complementary—is that this actually helps Martin and Pfeifer’s case,
even though their case ultimately fails. For they want to tie the ‘no particular height’
thought to the case of solubility in a particular liquid. That salt is soluble in a particu-
lar, existing sample of water is not dependent on that sample’s being at any particular
place, even though it cannot be soluble in the particular sample without that sam-
ple’s being at a particular place. This is supposed to be analogous to thinking of a
particular, existing man—who obviously must have a particular height—but without
thinking of him ‘in terms’ of his particular height. Both cases, I claim, are examples
of specific indifference—restriction to an object or range of objects but indifference to
particularities of that object or range. Putting the analogy in terms of ‘indeterminacy’,
however, is bound only to confuse. Onemight suppose, contra bothMolnar andMartin
& Pfeifer, that since every manifestation of a power is fully determinate (at least with
the deterministic powers), it is ‘illusory’ to suppose any indeterminacy in what powers
‘point to’. After all, ‘an infinity of fully determinate objects is not the same as a single
indeterminate one.’93
This objection is equal parts confusion and accuracy. The confusion is between the
‘what-forness’ of a power, to use Martin’s apposite term, and the ways in which the
what-forness is realized. No power, and no object of a power, is ‘the same as’ its con-
crete manifestations, at least for the physical intentionalist. The physical intentionalist
can consistently hold both that every manifestation of a given power is fully deter-
90 Anscombe (2002/1965, p. 58).
91 Martin and Pfeifer (1986, p. 534).
92 Martin and Pfeifer (1986, p. 533).
93 Bird (2007, p. 124) contra Molnar. Yet Bird falls into the very trap of which he accuses Molnar, since
Bird conflates determinism and determinacy whilst only a few lines later castigating Molnar for conflating
indeterminism and indeterminacy!
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minate and that what the power is for is not: there is indifference in the power, even
if there be no indifference in what actually happens when the power is manifested.
To deny the distinction is to beg the question against the physical intentionalist or to
misread what he is claiming.
The accurate part of the objection goes along the following lines94: ‘If you, Martin
and Pfeifer, say that salt has the power to dissolve in this “particular, existing” sample
of waterW, then the “what-forness” of the power you are attributing to salt is precisely
“to dissolve in W”. But if W is a particular, existing sample, why are you stopping
there? Why are you not expanding the “what-forness” to include also the various
“particular, existing” times, places, and circumstances in which salt has the power
to dissolve in W? Once you do all of the necessary expansion, it becomes clear that
what you are attributing to salt is the power to dissolve in a potentially infinite range
of particular samples of water, at a potentially infinite range of times and places,
and in a potentially infinite range of circumstances. Each combination of particular
sample, time, place, and circumstance will be fully determinate, even if we do not
know everything that does happen when salt dissolves in a particular case. In the end,
what you should be attributing to salt is the power to dissolve in a potentially infinite
disjunction of particular, fully determinate situations, with suitable dots added to cover
future or merely possible situations. But a disjunction of determinate manifestations
can never add up to an indeterminate manifestation.’
Something has gone wrong. The problem is that Martin and Pfeifer should never
have mentioned any particular sample of anything when attributing solubility to a
substance. They should have thought more about the second interpretation I offered
earlier of Anscombe’s ‘no particular height’ thought. The solubility of salt in water
is like the thought of a man in general, not like the thought of a ‘particular, existing’
man even if the latter is not thought of in terms of his particular height. The power
of salt in question is that of solubility in water tout court, just as the laws of nature
with respect to solubility do not mention particular samples or circumstances (fully
particularised circumstances, that is; they can and domention kinds of circumstances).
Once the power is correctly attributed, the relevant indeterminacy becomes clear, with
no threat of arbitrariness: the power is indeterminate in the sense of being determinable
by specifying the particular modes of the power, themselves not distinct powers. Salt
has the determinable power to dissolve in water, but particular samples of salt have
determinate powers to dissolve in particular samples at particular times and places.
This indeterminacy in the sense of determinability is, once again, just another way of
identifying the specific indifference of salt with respect to solubility in water. All of the
determinate manifestations that particular samples of salt display when dissolving in
particular samples of water are but manifestations of a single power. The single power
is not ‘for’ any of them in particular, nor identical to a disjunction of any or all of them;
rather, the various combinations of determinate powers andmanifestations are nomore
than forms, or better modes, the determinable—and in this sense indeterminate—
power can have. The power of salt to dissolve in water is to Fred’s thought of a man
94 Not something that Bird elaborates; nor does he even mention Martin and Pfeifer in this context.
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pure and simple, as the power of a particular sample of salt to dissolve in a particular
sample of water (and so on) is to Fred’s thought of Napoleon at Waterloo.
Yet for all that we may shore up the physical intentionalist case, it ultimately
fails—if the case is that the indeterminacy found in thought is on all fours with the
indeterminacy found in powers (the ‘only’ difference being that thought essentially
belongs to conscious beings and physical powers do not essentially do so). For the
crux of the difference is the freedom at the heart of abstraction, this being a difference
of kind from physical powers, not merely of degree. I have contended that both powers
and mental intentionality display specific indifference, but there is a difference in the
indifference. For a physical power like solubility, the only freedom of manifestation
within the specific range is whatever is allowed by the essence of the power bearer and
the essence of the object of the power.95 If the power bearer is salt, then however the
power is free to manifest is determined by the essence of salt. If water is the object,
then however salt’s power is free to manifest is determined by the essences of salt and
water. For example, salt is free to dissolve in this or that sample of water, at this or that
time or place; but it has no freedom to dissolve other than by the breaking of the salt
crystals’ ionic bonds by the water molecules. It has no freedom to dissolve in the way
that sugar dissolves in water, which involves the separation by the water molecules of
the sucrose molecules.96
To put the point more concretely: although an elementary chemistry textbookmight
tell you no more about what salt can do in water than that it has the power to dissolve
in it, this would be an incomplete description—strictly incomplete in the sense that
the whole truth of the matter requires further information about the precise chemical
process involved and how it differs from other, superficially similar but deeply dif-
ferent, processes of dissolution. Compare this to, say, a thought Fred has about birds:
he considers their various flight characteristics but prescinds from their reproductive
characteristics. He is not thinking of birds as animals that fly but do not reproduce:
he is thinking of birds as animals that fly without thinking of them as animals that
reproduce.97 In one sense, Fred’s thought about birds is incomplete: he is not think-
ing everything about birds in one and the same thought; nor could he; nor could any
thought be complete in this sense. This is the kind of incompleteness at which we
might gesture by calling the thought ‘indeterminate’. Nevertheless, Fred’s thought
is not strictly incomplete in the sense given immediately before: the whole truth of
the matter about his bird-thought is given in the description of it as a thought about
the flight characteristics of birds, and this even though he is certainly not thinking
of every flight characteristic of birds. The contrast between the thought on one hand
and the physical power on the other is clear and precise: the freedom in abstraction
means that there are many—infinitely many—ways in which the very same kind of
thought (defined by its object) can be had. Fred’s thought about birds is the same kind
of thought whether it is about their flight characteristics, their reproductive character-
95 Leave aside the essence of the circumstances, including the essence of the stimulus, purely for the sake
of simplicity.
96 Sodium chloride is not a molecule but an ionic compound: there is a fundamental chemical difference
between the process of dissolution of crystals of ionic compounds and of chains of molecules.
97 An important distinction of which Anscombe (1981/1974) reminded us in connection with Hume.
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istics, or both, or neither. In the case of a physical power, such as salt’s solubility in
water, the object of the power—what it is a power for—is as it were ‘locked down’
by the essence of the power bearer. There is no freedom in the specification of the
object: salt dissolves in water in one particular way. The only freedom allowed by the
power bearer is circumstantial—in respect of when, where, which samples of water
and salt, and in which allowable environmental conditions the power is manifested
on a particular occasion. Fred’s bird thought also has circumstantial freedom—when,
where, why it is had, and so on. But there is a further kind of freedom that is not
circumstantial, one that goes to the very content of the thought: that content can be
preserved, thus making it the same kind of thought, through variation of more specific
elements of the content. This freedom in abstraction means the essence of the thinker
does not lock down the content of the thought.98
Note that the freedom in abstraction I propose to be at the heart of the disanalogy
between mental and physical powers does not rely on a highly specific, and possibly
contentious, view about the individuation of thoughts or about identifying the subject
matter of a thought. Fred’s thought remains about birds whether he thinks of their flight
characteristics or their reproductive behaviour, on the assumption that he is thinking
about birds at all. If we claim that the flight thought and the reproduction thought are
not instances of the same kind of thought because one is about flight and one is about
reproduction, then clearly we cannot say that Fred was thinking about birds in the first
place. We can always say that Fred was thinking about the characteristics of birds
rather than about birds, so we could then legitimately call the flight thought and the
reproduction thought instances of the same kind of thought. But we do not have to
say this either. Thinkers have all kinds of thoughts in all kinds of succession, with no
apparent connections between them, and we are not obliged to say that each thought
is some kind of content-preserving variation on a prior thought. My point is simply
that it is of the essence of thought that it can work this way, and that it must work this
way in general for any being that genuinely has the power of thought.
One might object that in order for this disanalogy between mental and physical
powers to go through, I have to rule out the very possibility of multi-track dispo-
sitions.99 For if there are powers that have multiple kinds of manifestation, doesn’t
this look more like the case of mental intentionality than the single-track case where
only one kind of manifestation is in focus, such as the particular process whereby salt
dissolves in water? Moreover, the mere contingent absence of multi-track dispositions
(if this be so) is not enough to support my case: I have to show them to be in some
98 Apart, of course, from the plausible notion that the essence of the thinker as rational locks down all
thought content to what is meaningful, logically possible, and perhaps more. I note here that a materialist,
of course, will insist that the content of a thought is locked down by the structure and behaviour of the brain:
abstraction vanishes at the neuronal level, and all we find—so the objection goes—are physico-chemical
processes that are fundamentally no different, for the purpose of present discussion, from what salt does
when it dissolves in water. Needless to say, I have no space here to take on the materialist. All I can do is
register the objection and reply that a brute materialist response puts the cart before the horse. It’s not that
materialism is so evidently true that what I say about abstraction is easily refuted, but that abstraction is so
evidently a feature of mentality (in rational thinkers) that the burden is on the materialist to show how it
can be captured within their framework.
99 Thanks to an anonymous referee for prompting me to address this.
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way incoherent or metaphysically impossible. In reply, I noted previously that the
thesis of specific indifference—that specific indifference is the best way to understand
powers—is not the thesis that powers/dispositions must be multi-track, but I would
now add that whether there aremulti-track powers at all is irrelevant to the disanalogy I
draw between mental and physical powers. My claim is not that a given mental power
has different kinds of manifestation whereas no given physical power has different
kinds of manifestation. Rather, it is that the given manifestation of a mental power
always, and essentially, may vary both circumstantially and as to specific content,
the latter due to the essentially abstractive nature of thought. By contrast, no given
manifestation of a physical power may vary in anything other than a circumstantial
way, there being no analogue of abstraction in the purely physical. So, to return to
Fred, I take his having a bird-thought—a thought about birds—to be a manifestation
of his mental power of thought. Given the essentially abstractive nature of thought,
that thought could be had in various ways that are not merely circumstantial (varia-
tions of time and place, for instance): Fred’s thought about avian mating habits is as
much a bird-thought as his thought about their nest-building behaviour. By contrast,
salt’s dissolution in water, which is the manifestation of salt’s solubility in water, can
only vary circumstantially, not across different kinds of process. Now suppose the
existence of a multi-track power: let’s take solubility to be such a power possessed by
salt. If, say, and with no pretence to scientific accuracy, we take its manifestations to
be dissolution in water, dissolution in alcohol, and dissolution in dimethyl sulphoxide,
we still see that each manifestation of the multi-track power will consist of a single
process that can vary only circumstantially. If there is no analogue of abstraction in a
single manifestation, there will be no such analogue in a disjunction of manifestations.
To clarify further, it is important to see that the thesis that thoughts are essentially
abstractive is not the same as the thesis that thoughts are essentially generic. The latter
is false while the former is true, even though genericity of thought is oneway in which
thought can be abstractive. So, if Fred thinks about birds in general but no specific
kinds of birds, he thinks a generic thought, and this is one way in which his thought
is abstract: it abstracts from specific kinds of birds. But his thought must be abstract
in other ways as well: if his thought is that birds fly, it abstracts from all the other
things birds do; if it is that birds are fun to watch, it abstracts from all the other ways
one might interact with birds; and so on. Even the highly specific identity thought that
Marilyn Monroe is Norma Jeane Mortenson is abstract but not generic: it abstracts
from all the other facts about Marilyn Monroe (at the very least, all the other facts
about her name/s). Thoughts, by their nature, must select features of reality as their
content; rather, their thinkers must select features of reality as the content of their
thoughts, in abstraction from others.
Not so with powers, appearances to the contrary. One way in which a power might
be multi-track is due to its genericity: the solubility of salt, for instance, might be
manifested by more specific kinds of dissolution, say in liquids of kind K , liquids
of kind L , and liquids of kind M . Suppose K , L , and M , to be themselves genera of
liquids, each with more than one specific sub-kind as an instance. Then all we have is a
multi-track generic powerwith several genericmanifestations. Butwe know, of course,
that this cannot be the end of the story, since neither salt nor any other substancemerely
dissolves tout court, nor does salt, on this scenario, merely dissolve in liquids of kinds
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K , L , and M . The whole story must include the most specific kinds of liquid in which
water dissolves—say, in our toy example, water, alcohol, and dimethyl sulphoxide.
These will be, as scholastics call them, the infima species, or lowest species, of liquids
in which salt dissolves. And for each one of these lowest species of liquid, there will
be no indifference as to kind of manifestation, only indifference as to circumstance of
manifestation. There is only one kind of process whereby salt dissolves in water, and
one whereby it dissolves in alcohol, and one whereby it dissolves in DMSO. If this is
not the case, it can only be because of further genera we have not yet identified, that
is, kinds of water, alcohol, or DMSO.
This picture of physical powers is no parallel to the abstractive nature of thought.
The story of the manifestation of the power of thought—say, of Fred’s power to think
about birds—endswithwhatever bird-thought Fred has: but that thoughtwill always be
one ofmany that Fred could have had, any of which would have manifested the power
of thinking about birds, and each one of which would have had a different content.
Each of these thoughts will itself be essentially abstract, no matter how specific the
thought, and so the correlative power of thinking that thoughtwill have further,multiple
manifestation kinds (themselves all abstract as well, ad infinitum). There is only the
appearance of a parallel with physical powers. Nothing soluble, salt or anything else,
has the unqualified power to dissolve; nothing just dissolves. The whole story of salt’s
solubility must go beyond its generic powers to the infima species of liquids in which it
dissolves. But once we are at the level of infima species, there is no more indifference
to kind of manifestation: for each infima species of liquid, there is one and only one
way in which salt dissolves in it. By contrast, even the most specific thought a thinking
being can have about something, say a singular identity thought, is always no more
than one way in which a thinker can have a thought about one (or more) of the objects
in that thought. Moreover, that thought itself—say, that Norma Jeane Mortenson is
Marilyn Monroe—is not only the manifestation of a power but is associated with
a further, correlative power of the thinker, namely the power to think about NJM’s
identity with MM: if you can think that NJM = MM, then eo ipso you can think about
NJM’s identity with MM, for example that the identity is surprising, or of special
historical interest, or a little-known fact. All of these thoughts are manifestations of
the power of thinking about the identity. Again, all of them are abstractive in content:
some features of the identity are considered, others not. Nothing like this can be found
in the world of physical powers, multi-track or not.
Let us take stock. Of course physical powers do not think about their possible
manifestations; neither do they ‘think’ about them. For all its suggestiveness and for
all the truth underlying the idea of physical intentionality, there is no advance in
metaphysical understanding to be gained by importing essentially mental categories
into our analysis of the physical world. I would go further and assert that this way of
thinking, for all its useful correctives tomuch of the naive physicalism andmaterialism
pervading metaphysics, threatens to resuscitate the confused and confusing debates
about final causes from several centuries ago, thereby undermining the proper revival
of the concept of finality as it should be understood.What we should be comparing are
notmental actualities and physical powers, but themental and physical powers and how
they are manifested. Both mental and physical powers possess finality understood as
specific indifference. No power, be it mental or physical, can be hadwithout restriction
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to a specific range of objects and indifference within that range. The key difference—
the one overlooked in the debate at worst, confusedly appreciated at best—is that when
a rational creature thinks a thought, thereby manifesting the power of thought, they do
andmust abstract—thereby displaying the finality possessed by the underlying power,
which they manifest by the actual thought. But when a physical power manifests, the
manifestation has no such correlate: it is wholly particularised or concretised, there
being only one way, invariant across different circumstances (of time, place, and
environment), in which the manifestation takes place.
Hence, to make a glib100 comparison of the form: ‘S can think of X in this way
rather than that’ and ‘Physical power P can have manifestation M in this way rather
than that’ is tomiss everything that is important in this debate. Themanifestation of the
power of thought is always aspectual; there is no such correlate in the case of physical
powers. Interestingly—briefly taking a broader perspective—this aspectuality is both
a strength and a weakness of the rational animals that we humans are. It is a strength
inasmuch as it is the source of reason itself and of the control over nature that reason
allows. The aspectuality of abstraction enables focus, judgment, and inference—the
ability to make connections unavailable to a non-rational creature. On the other hand,
it is also a weakness inasmuch as we are forever condemned never to see anything in
all of its aspects, either at a time or over time. Our finite intelligences must engage in
ratiocination in order to arrive at any knowledge beyond the immediately perceptual
and sensory precisely because we are unable to see all the aspects of anything. Being
able to see all aspects means being able to see all connections. Since we cannot see
all connections—whether within an object or between distinct objects—we have to
reason in order to make the connections we cannot see, and this always in no more
than a finite, piecemeal fashion. The best way of understanding this weakness is to
contrast our minds with the mind of a being that did see all the aspects of everything.
For such a being, all connections would be evident; there would be no connections to
make, and hence no reasoning in which to engage. Such a being would not need to put
two and two together to get four, as it were, because for such a being there would be
nothing to put together in the first place.
7 Conclusion
I have argued that finality, at least when considering powers and their manifestations,
is best understood by means of the concept of specific indifference. In the case of
physical powers there is always restriction to a range of manifestations, coupled with
some degree of indifference within the range as to the circumstances of manifestation.
In the case of mental powers, thought is always restricted in its object, within which
there is indifference as to how an object is thought of. The crucial difference is that the
finality of thought involves abstraction, which gives freedom where there is none in
the manifestation of a physical power. Whereas abstraction is something that rational
thinkersdo, the finality of physical powers is something theymerely have.Theprogress
100 I am not accusing any physical intentionalist of glibness; I am only suggesting that a superficially
appealing analogy of this kind might motivate sympathy for the physical intentionalist viewpoint.
123
Synthese
in understanding provided by the idea of physical intentionality lies not in specious
comparisons between the mind in the person and the ‘mind in nature’.101 Rather, it
resides in the long-discarded idea of finality that the contemporary analysis of powers
has, inadvertently or not, succeeded in reviving.
With all of this in view, we can at least partially demystify physical intentionality.
In the end it is no more nor less than a kind of finality. The same is true of mental
intentionality. For a materialist, mental intentionality will be just a species of physical
intentionality—the kind in which consciousness, or mental representation, plays an
essential role. For anyone (such as myself) who thinks that the abstraction at the heart
of mental finality cannot be explained in purely material terms, there will only be
at best a partial overlap between mental and physical finality. Both will be genuine
species of finality, but the physical will never be generic relative to the mental.
In any case, we have still only reached a point of partial demystification. The
demystification lies in the removal of worries about ‘spooky’ panpsychist or animist
implications of the kind that concern Mumford and other sceptics of physical finality.
It lies also in the recognition that the pre-modern concept of finality has a metaphys-
ically and scientifically respectable—indeed ineliminable—place in our best account
of reality. The partialness of the demystification, however, lies in the same fact—that
the world contains irreducible finality, without which efficient causation itself cannot
be explained. Should we rest content, along with Aristotle, in accepting a purely nat-
uralistic account of this finality? In other words, is it enough to accept that finality
is part of the very fabric of physical and mental reality? Or should we feel some of
the discontent felt by the scholastics, in particular Aquinas, over the idea that this
phenomenon of ‘directedness’—the governance by final causes of all agency—might
require no further explanation? Foundational questions such as these, already begin-
ning to be addressed in contemporary metaphysics,102 demand further investigation.
For the present, at least we have an answer to the simple question, ‘Is there physical
intentionality?’. It can be summarised by what Aquinas himself would have said if
asked: ‘Non proprie dictu, sed secundum quid’.103
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